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Abstract
This Comment compares the development of sexual harassment law in the United States and
India. It strives to contribute to this global feminist debate by highlighting the successes and fail-
ures of each country’s respective anti-harassment protections. It also compares the United States’
and India’s legal approaches to the problem of workplace sexual harassment. The Comment also
discusses the successes and failures of the U.S. and Indian protections in a manner that attempts
to minimize the problems present in cross-cultural studies.
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INTRODUCTION
Pornographic e-mails circulate like wildfire through the e-
mail system of an Australian corporation.' A male Division Com-
mander in the Korean Army repeatedly corners a female lieuten-
ant in his office and forcibly kisses her.2 Male students in Ire-
land vandalize the classrooms of two female teachers with sexu-
ally explicit graffiti.3 An Indian social worker suffers a brutal
gang rape as a result of her crusade against child marriages in an
Indian village.4 As these examples demonstrate, workplace sex-
ual harassment is a widespread and severe global problem.5
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Laura Rosenbury for her challenging edits, endless encouragement, and belief in the
importance of student feminist work. This Comment is dedicated to my brother, Neal
Feld.
1. See Nicole Manktelow, Death by a Thousand Emails, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Nov. 10, 2001, at 4 (noting incident resulting in firing of staff at offices of Australian
company).
2. See Division Commander Suspended for Sexual Harassment, KoREA HERALD, Jan. 18,
2001 [hereinafter Commander Suspended] (describing female officer's subjection to her
supervisor's sexual harassment and advances).
3. See Emmet Oliver, Labour Court Awards Teacher Eur 40,000, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 1,
2002, at 4 (describingjudgment against school for students' sexual harassment of teach-
ers).
4. See Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 S.C.R. 3011 (India), available at http://
www.lawinc.com [hereinafter Vishaka] (describing assault and rape of social worker).
5. See Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1227, 1227-
31 (1994) (discussing spread of U.S. concept of sexual harassment law to Europe);
Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An International Perspective on Sexual Harassment
Law, 12 LAw & INEQ. 43, 43 (1993) (stating that after Hill-Thomas hearings, sexual
harassment was at forefront of global consciousness); Namita Bhandare et a., Workplace
Victory, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 1, 1997, at 66 (asserting that sexual harassment has achieved
pop culture status in India because of high-profile U.S. cases, such as those involving
President Clinton and Justice Thomas, carried around the world by the media, and
quoting Shobha De, Indian author and pop culture diva, who stated that it is politically
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Feminists throughout the world engage in the task of trying to
restructure traditional solutions to this problem.6
This Comment, which compares the development of sexual
harassment law in the United States and India, strives to contrib-
ute to this global feminist debate by highlighting the successes
and failures of each country's respective anti-harassment protec-
tions. Part I of this Comment acknowledges the difficulties in-
herent in cross-cultural comparison and, in an attempt to over-
come these difficulties, details an anti-imperialist, anti-hierarchal
theory to compare and analyze women's issues across and be-
tween cultures. Part II of this Comment introduces and explores
the problem of workplace sexual harassment in the United
States and India, examining the history of sexual harassment,
and theorists' discussions of the origin of sexual harassment in
both countries. Then, looking at U.S. and Indian Supreme
Court definitions of sexual harassment and assignation of em-
ployer liability, Part II traces the development of the existing
U.S. and Indian laws that were designed to protect women from,
and combat against, workplace sexual harassment. Finally, Part
III compares the United States' and India's legal approaches to
the problem of workplace sexual harassment. Part III discusses
the successes and failures of the U.S. and Indian protections in a
manner that attempts to minimize the problems present in cross-
cultural studies.7
correct to talk about sexual harassment because it is happening in West). See generally
Joseph M. Kelly & Bob Watt, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases: A Comparative Study of
American, Canadian, and British Law, 16 N.Y.L. ScH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 79 (1996) (com-
paring compensation and damages paid to successful sexual harassment plaintiffs in
United States, Canada, and Great Britain); Jacqueline M. Efron, The Transnational Appli-
cation of Sexual Harassment Laws: A Cultural Barrier in Japan, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
133 (1999) (describing sexual harassment as universal and ubiquitous).
6. See Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HAxv.
WOMEN's L.J. 89, 98 (1996) [hereinafter Higgins, Anti-Essentialism] (recognizing exis-
tence of global feminist politics); Efron, supra note 5, at 134-35 (describing scholars'
debates about workplace sexual harassment, especially in context of growing multina-
tional enterprises). See generally Anna M. Han, Exploring Feminism Globally to Achieve
Global Feminism, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 785 (2001) (describing global discussion
of feminism, and discussion's possibilities and importance).
7. This Comment recognizes that a multitude of cultural norms influence the sex-
ual harassment of women in the United States and India, and inform both the judicial
and the societal responses to such harassment. Both countries contain enormous popu-
lations with varying geographical regions, cultures, religions, and ways of life. To avoid
essentializing the experiences of women in the United States and India, this Comment
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I. SHADES OF GRAY: UN1VERSALISM, RELATIVISM,
AND THE MIDDLE GROUND IN CROSS-
CULTURAL COMPARISONS
Promoting women's rights, including anti-sexual harass-
ment protections, in a global context poses several difficulties.'
First, there are methodological difficulties inherent in cross-cul-
tural studies.9 Second, Western feminists working in a global
context run the risk of imposing cultural norms derived from
Western moral thought on women in other cultures.1 ° Finally,
governments and activists alike may put forth cultural justifica-
tions for oppressive State actions.1 Given these difficulties, fem-
inists and human rights workers must understand both the spe-
focuses only on U.S. and-Indian Supreme Court approaches and decisions concerning
workplace sexual harassment.
8. See NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES ACROSS COUN-
TRIES AND CULTURES 20-21 (Rosalind P. Petchesky & KarenJudd eds., 1998) (explaining
that cross-cultural reproductive rights study presents unavoidable tension between polit-
ical ideology and truly listening to other women's voices and opinions); see also MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 35 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, DE-
VELOPMENT] (recognizing that exercise of cross-cultural comparison and development
of defensible set of cross-cultural categories is difficult, intellectually and politically);
Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 119-20 (urging Western feminists to eschew
simplistic assumptions about other cultures' lack of freedom for women, and adopt
new, consciousness-raising approach to cross-cultural advocacy and communication);
Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1997) (cautioning against applying Western liberal ideals across cultures).
9. See NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 21-22 (explaining struc-
tural problems of cross-cultural study, including geographical distance, funding, and
determining approach to study); see, e.g., Nancy R. Hauserman, Comparing Conversations
About Sexual Harassment in the United States and Sweden: Print Media Coverage of the Case
Against Astra USA, 14 WIs. WOMEN'S LJ. 45, 56-57 (1999) (recognizing possible techni-
cal difficulties in cross-cultural studies). See generally Janet Sigal & Heidi Jacobsen, A
Cross-Cultural Exploration of Factors Affecting Reactions to Sexual Harassment Attitudes and
Policies, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 760, 760-65 (1999) (explaining cross-cultural sexual
harassment study and problems inherent in study).
10. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 100 (explaining that many West-
ern feminists sometimes assert their Western-derived political vision into non-Western
world); Otto, supra note 8, at 2 (cautioning against generally applying Western morality
in non-Western countries); Shefali Desai, Note, Hearing Afghan Women's Voices: Feminist
Theory's Re-Conceptualization of Women's Human Rights, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 805,
810 (1999) (asserting that Westerners' attempts to employ universal human rights stan-
dards that stem from Western ideology draw criticisms of neo-colonialism).
11. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 (warning that State actors
often invoke cultural claims to justify oppression); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory
of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism,
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 49, 92 (1993) (recognizing that male-controlled govern-
ments use excuse of culture to stifle women's rights and choices); Otto, supra note 8, at
13-14 (explaining that cultural arguments can mask oppressive aims of patriarchy).
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cific situation of women in other cultures, as well as in their own
cultures, and critically examine the parallels and differences be-
tween the two, in order to be effective advocates on behalf of
women in other countries and cultures.
12
A. Potential Methodological Problems
Women's advocates caution that cross-cultural analysis must
be conducted with extreme caution, especially when feminists in
the United States critique non-Western law and culture.1" First,
cross-cultural comparisons can be rife with technical difficulties,
given language differences and the necessity of translation.' 4
Those conducting the comparisons may misunderstand state-
ments, legal decisions, and the nature of the problem in gen-
eral. 5 Individual subjects may also discuss certain topics less
12. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 126 (urging advocates to forge
realistic strategy that respects commonality and difference between cultures); Han,
supra note 6, at 789-90 (advocating sharing women's stories to further exploration of
women's similarities and differences, in order to achieve global feminism); Kim, supra
note 11 (exploring how feminist theorists can reconceptualize women's rights and
human rights debates). See generally Otto, supra note 8 (urging restructuring approach
to women's rights in global context).
13. See NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 35 (describing cross-cultural
comparisons as peril-fraught); Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 98 (challeng-
ing feminists and human rights workers to examine how they advocate for women in
different cultures); Otto, supra note 8, at 2 (asserting that Westerners should not as-
sume people elsewhere want to live and be treated as Westerners want to live and be
treated); see also Keven H. Friedman & Christine R. Mertz, Borderline Sexual Harassment:
A Study of Sex Based Discrimination in the United States and Argentina and the Problem of
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 15 HoFsTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 569, 571
(1998) (urging U.S. women's advocates to confront U.S. sexual harassment policies and
problems before applying U.S. ideals and laws to international sexual harassment
problems).
14. See Sigal &Jacobsen, supra note 9, at 765 (noting that some countries translate
their studies into English, while others conduct studies in their native tongue); see also
NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 25 (explaining that translating and
editing women's voices into languages that are not their own risks misinterpretation
and misrepresentation of those voices); Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism
Good for Third World/Minority Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 41, 42
(Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (explaining that Western women writing about other
cultures rely on secondary sources, and therefore may make significant factual errors in
assessing other cultures or belief systems).
15. See NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIrrHTs, supra note 8, at 21-22 (explaining
structural problems of cross-cultural study, including geographical distance, funding,
and determining approach to study); Hauserman, supra note 9, at 56-57 (recognizing
that different countries treat speech differently, and therefore media in those countries
may use varying approaches to reporting legal problems); Sigal & Jacobsen, supra note
9, at 760-65 (describing research program examining reactions to sexual harassment
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freely with members of other cultures, depending on the sub-
jects' personal level of discomfort with an issue, as well as their
adherence to societal norms.1 6
Additionally, cross-cultural researchers admit that cross-cul-
tural exploration and advocacy can fall prey to larger cultural
misunderstandings.17 Sociocultural factors, such as the individu-
alistic or collectivist nature of a culture, the receptiveness of a
culture towards reform, and the existence of formal policies (or
lack thereof) on the subject in question may inform a society's
opinion on an issue.1 8 Issues of reproductive rights addressed in
international forums serve as an example.' 9 Critics assert that
some feminists in the United States fail to translate reproductive
rights debates into a broader, international language, instead ad-
occurring in university settings in several countries, including United States, Canada,
Ecuador, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Pakistan, and explaining meth-
odological difficulties present in such cross-cultural comparisons).
16. See Hauserman, supra note 9, at 62 (explaining that Swedes interviewed
claimed they could talk more openly about sex than people in United States); Sigal &
Jacobsen, supra note 9, at 765 (describing how researchers had to modify hypothetical
scenario in their study to include engaged woman, as opposed to woman with boy-
friend, when they administered study in Pakistan, because men and women in that soci-
ety do not interact freely); see also NEGOTIATING REPRODUCrIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at
22-25 (explaining need for researcher and subject to overcome discomfort stemming
from political, economic, and social differences between them).
17. See Phoebe A. Haddon, All the Difference in the World: Listening and Hearing the
Voices of Women, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 377, 378 (1999) (explaining that
culture shapes women's ideas about equality and justice); Hauserman, supra note 9, at
62 (disagreeing with Swedish interviewees' opinions on U.S. culture); see also Desai,
supra note 10, at 817 (grounding debate in realistic example to minimize cross-cultural
misunderstanding).
18. See Efron, supra note 5, at 135 (recognizing that societal norms and attitudes
towards sexual harassment differ across cultures); Sigal &Jacobsen, supra note 9, at 772-
81 (discussing how sociocultural factors influenced outcome of authors' study); see also
Hauserman, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining that cultural difference effects storytelling
and story perceptions); Kim, supra note 11, at 69-70 (citing reproductive rights debate
as example of international concern and tool of oppression in many different coun-
tries, including United States).
19. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 90 (describing failure of Western
attendees of 1994 United Nations ("U.N.") Population Conference in Cairo to address
non-Western visions of women and family roles, and resulting political obstacles); Tracy
E. Higgins, Regarding Rights: An Essay Honoring the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 225, 246 (1999) [hereinafter
Higgins, Regarding Rights] (citing 1994 United Nations Population Conference in Cairo
and 1995 United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing). See generally NEGOTIATING
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8 (studying reproductive rights in seven countries to
better understand goal of reproductive rights and importance of goal in different coun-
tries).
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vocating for women's rights solely in the context of Western ide-
ology.20 These advocates in the United States are criticized for
focusing on sexual freedom and individual autonomy when ad-
vocating for reproductive rights, and subsequently ignoring non-
Western interests, such as population control.21 As a result, non-
Western leaders may decline to support reproductive rights
projects because such initiatives appear to represent disagreea-
ble Western ideologies, rather than potential benefits. 2 2 In turn,
reproductive rights advocates from the United States may mis-
construe such decisions as patriarchally motivated, thereby exac-
erbating the cultural misunderstanding.23
Finally, critics acknowledge that perhaps most dangerous to
the success and accuracy of a cross-cultural study is the nature of
researchers' own perceptions and subjective moral standards re-
garding both the culture to which one belongs and the culture
20. See NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 20-21 (questioning
how to deal with women's voices in other cultures that espouse different priorities and
support ideologies with which we do not agree); Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6,
at 90 (explaining that this failure to recognize different cultures' ideals concerning
family resulted in Vatican joining with several Muslim governments to denounce West-
ern advocates as attempting to impose Western sexual freedoms upon other cultures);
see also Kim, supra note 11, at 70 (including United States in list of countries where
reproductive rights are subject to oppressive State regulation, thereby highlighting ne-
cessity of global approach to problem).
21. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 90 (citing Pakistani Prime Minis-
ter Benazir Bhutto's recognition that reproductive control could help address problems
of overpopulation, but often represents Western attempts to impose sexual norms on
rest of world); see also NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 302-04 (de-
termining from international study that women's primary reason for desiring reproduc-
tive control is their role and view of motherhood, and asserting that individual liberty is
important, yet secondary).
22. See Alan Cowell, Vatican Rejects Compromise on Abortion at U.N. Meeting, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (quoting Islamic newspaper's criticism of conference as rep-
resenting lack of morality and calling for promiscuity); see also Higgins, Regarding Rights,
supra note 19, at 246 (explaining that non-Western leaders couched arguments de-
nouncing conference agenda in language of difference, but really only offered alterna-
tive vision of universal norms); Kim, supra note 11, at 57 (explaining that Western and
non-Western leaders differ about priorities, means, and goals for their countries' pro-
gress and growth).
23. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (admitting that one Western
feminist response to cultural representative's claim that women's roles reflect cultural
norms is that culture is simply justification for oppression); see also NEGOTIATING REPRO-
DuCrIVE RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 266-70 (detailing reproductive rights history in United
States, and demonstrating different approaches and opinions about reproductive rights
within different U.S. cultures and regions); Otto, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that
Westerners vilify non-Western traditions).
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with which one's culture is compared. 24  Expected outcomes,
sometimes based on stereotypes, may exist when one initiates a
study comparing her own culture to that of a foreign nation or
group. 25 Furthermore, opinions or awareness of one's own cul-
ture may also improperly influence a cultural study.2 6
B. Universalism v. Relativism
International human rights advocates express concern that
methods employed to carry out cross-cultural critique may prove
potentially hazardous for the position and treatment of mem-
bers of other cultures. 27 On one hand, commentators recognize
that human rights workers, by asserting universal moral norms,
may imperialistically impose values on those for whom they advo-
cate. 28 For example, non-Western leaders criticize the privileg-
24. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 386 (recognizing that Western feminists display
inconsistencies in willingness to tolerate body mutilation in different contexts, such as
Western non-health related surgeries); Kim, supra note 11, at 61 (explaining that rela-
tivists criticize feminists for attempting to impose Western moral standards on non-
Western societies); Otto, supra note 8, at 2 (cautioning against blanket application of
Western moral ideals in non-Western countries). See generally Leti Volpp, Talking "Cul-
ture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573
(1996) [hereinafter Volpp, Talking Culture] (criticizing feminists in West for making
assumptions about non-Western women's difficulties and ignoring negative realities
present in Western women's lives).
25. See Shobha A. Menon & Suresh Kanekar, Attitudes Toward Sexual Harassment of
Women in India, 22J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1940, 1947 (1992) (using language demon-
strating that certain results were anticipated, such as "most unexpected" and "as ex-
pected"); see, e.g., Sigal & Jacobson, supra note 9, at 770 (making statements, such as
"sexual harassment may be high in countries with more traditional gender-role attitudes,"
which evidence conditional, cautious language used in cross-cultural studies) (emphasis
added).
26. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1947 (registering surprise that Indian
subjects did not assign more blame to divorced sexual harassment victims than to sexu-
ally harassed); see also Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (criticizing feminists
in West for assuming Western life is less oppressive to women, and therefore better for
women than non-Western life); Haddon, supra note 17, at 379-80 (critiquing Western
feminists who do not self-reflect, and therefore fail to see their own subordination and
perpetuation of subordination of others); Otto, supra note 8, at 33 (encouraging West-
ern feminists to recognize their privileged position).
27. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1573 (critiquing "backlash scholar-
ship" that concerns culture, gender, race, and multiculturalism); Haddon, supra note
17, at 379 (calling cross-cultural equality work complex project necessitating hard work
to actually succeed); Otto, supra note 8, at 7 (explaining that universal law of human
rights can potentially erase cultural diversity); Desai, supra note 10, at 812 (describing
certain feminist methods of human rights advocacy as faulty).
28. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 92 (citing Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ("U.D.H.R."), which embraced assumption of universality of human
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ing of political and civil rights, at the expense of cultural norms,
evident in the earliest human rights documents, which Wes-
terners primarily authored.29 On the other hand, commentators
warn against the dangers of cultural relativism, because the refu-
tation of an objective standard of morality may permit assertion
of cultural differences to defend oppression.30
1. Universalism
Historians explain that the authors of the earliest human
rights documents, signed after World War II,31 embraced the
idea that there existed a set of universal human rights.3 2 Early
rights and contained standards and values prevalent in West); Kim, supra note 11, at 60-
61 (describing common relativist critique of Western feminist approaches to interna-
tional advocacy); Otto, supra note 8, at 7 (noting critique that West is guilty of ascribing
cultural inferiority to non-Western cultures and priorities).
29. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 93 (recognizing criticism some
commentators have expressed about hierarchy of human rights created in international
human rights documents, in which political and civil rights dominate social and cul-
tural rights); Kim, supra note 11, at 57 (explaining debate between leaders of Western
and non-Western countries concerning priorities regarding human rights); Otto, supra
note 8, at 6 (explaining international human rights hierarchy, which subordinates tradi-
tionally non-Western rights, such as claims of indigenous peoples and solidarity rights).
30. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 (explaining how cultural de-
fenses can justify oppressive State actions); Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at
243 (recognizing that culture is sometimes asserted to continue oppressive practices);
Kim, supra note 11, at 104 (arguing that practices affecting women's lives are deemed
cultural, and therefore sometimes escape international scrutiny); Desai, supra note 10,
at 815 (asserting that feminism should not blindly accept culture as excuse to justify
oppressive treatment of women).
31. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 92 (explaining that because
U.D.H.R. was written directly after Nazi Holocaust, global audience feared any moral
relativism that would permit similar occurrences); see also RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAw, POLICY, AND PRACrICE 5
(1995) (asserting that World War II served as catalyst in producing revolutionary devel-
opments in international human rights); Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Univer-
salist Controversy, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 71, 75 (1999) (describing 1945 Charter Conven-
tion of United Nations); Desai, supra note 10, at 808 (describing post-World War II
roots of modern human rights law).
32. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 92 (stating that U.D.H.R. em-
braced assumptions that human rights are universal); see also Martha Nussbaum, Women
and Work-The Capabilities Approach, THE LITTLE MAGAZINE, June 2000, at http://
www.littlemag.com/martha.htm [hereinafter Nussbaum, Women and Work] (listing cen-
tral human functional capabilities, including control over one's environment, in forms
of effective political participation, free speech, ability to hold property, right to equal
employment and ability to work); Otto, supra note 8, at 7 (explaining that earliest au-
thors of human rights documents assumed that objective, true knowledge about rights
is possible); Desai, supra note 10, at 808 (listing human rights recognized following
World War II, including liberty and security of person).
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treaties, such as the Charter of the United Nations ("U.N.
Charter") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("U.D.H.R."), list principles of equality, anti-discrimination, and
peace.33 According to historians, the inclusion of these suppos-
edly universal rights in these international conventions reveals
the authors' idea that such protections are the basic principles
that all societies should incorporate into their political systems to
ensure fairness to all people 4.3  Because these rights are funda-
mental to humanity, as the international documents declare, a
person does not have to earn them.3 ' Rather, they apply to every
person, regardless of the society in which she may live.3 6 In the
context of women's rights, women's advocates assert that such
assumptions present an opportunity for unity among women, re-
gardless of their backgrounds.37 Not surprisingly, however, crit-
ics recognize that these supposedly universal rights reflect West-
ern political thought. 8 Thus, many critics disparage universalist
33. See generally U.N. CHRTEiR art. 1; U.D.H.R. art. 1.
34. See Maurice Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, in DAEDALUS 15 (1983)
(explaining that natural rights combined with human vulnerability result in man's liv-
ing under system of rules that ensure peace for himself and his neighbors); Otto, supra
note 8, at 7 (explaining that U.D.H.R. drafters attempted to produce document free of
political and cultural allegiances that guaranteed all people fundamental freedoms);
Ritter, supra note 31, at 75 (stating purpose of Charter was to reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights and equal rights of all people); Desai, supra note 10, at 808 (stat-
ing universalist idea that international human rights apply equally to people every-
where).
35. See Cranston, supra note 34, at 12 (distinguishing human rights, deprivation of
life, which represents grave affront to justice, and other "wishes," such as social security,
which are not moral imperatives, but "ideals"); Ritter, supra note 31, at 77-78 (explain-
ing that all individuals hold human rights simply because they are human); Desai, supra
note 10, at 808 (explaining that universal human rights standards rest upon notion that
all people are entitled to core set of rights simply because they are human).
36. See Cranston, supra note 34, at 12 (refuting John Locke's assertion that all
rights must be earned, and making distinction between moral rights and those rights
that must be earned, such as right to property); Kim, supra note 11, at 63-64 (explaining
that many human rights scholars find certain rights fundamental and, therefore, uni-
versal); Ritter, supra note 31, at 77-78 (explaining that all humans hold human rights
equally).
37. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 99 (discussing that focus of wo-
men's groups on common experience of private oppression, rather than on political
rights, represents triumph of universalism); Kim, supra note 11, at 53-54 (describing
traditional liberal feminism as attempting to eliminate discrimination against all wo-
men); Ritter, supra note 31, at 79 (stating that human rights language prevents differ-
ence in worth based on socially defining characteristic, such as sex).
38. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 6-10 (1990) (recognizing that interna-
tional human rights are derived from English, American, and French natural rights
theories and stating that idea of human rights has spread beyond West, and, nominally
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thought because it can potentially exclude those non-Western
cultural ideals and norms that Western cultures do not value.3 9
2. Cultural Relativism
Oppositely, scholars explain that cultural relativists refute
the existence of universal norms, arguing that different cultures
should be entitled to create their own specifically tailored
human rights norms.40  Cultural relativists find the truths es-
poused within a culture contingent on that culture's values and
practices.4 1 Since all cultures are equally valid in the eyes of cul-
tural relativists, cultural norms exist as truth to that culture, re-
gardless of how other cultures may react.42 Thus, commentators
assert that cultural relativism functions not only to link morality
at least, has been universally accepted); Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 231
(stating that human rights framework derives from Western political thought); Otto,
supra note 8, at 8 (stating that Western States are scared to acquiesce to non-Western
ideals).
39. See, e.g., al-Hibri, supra note 14 (explaining that Western women may misinter-
pret or misrepresent other cultures or belief systems); see also Sander Gilman, "Barbaric"
Rituals, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14, at 53 (using previ-
ously held view that Jewish male circumcision ritual ("brith melah") was barbaric as
example of howcurrent Anglo-American culture can mistakenly define morality); Otto,
supra note 8, at 7 (stating that post-structuralist perspective recognizes culturally contin-
gent nature of truth); Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral World, in Is MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14, at 69, 72 (asserting that requiring minority cultures to
conform to Western. fundamental liberal values is equivalent to saying that minority
cultures should be respected only if they become liberal, which shows intolerance and
disrespect for minority identity).
40. See ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM V.
RELATIVISM 56-60 (1990) (using examples of child labor and female circumcision to
demonstrate that not all cultures share common conception of human rights, thereby
negating presumption of universality); see also Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at
95 (stating that cultural relativists are skeptical about availability of universal norms);
Desai, .supra note 10, at 809 (recognizing that rights and morality rules depend on cul-
tural context).
41. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 95 (explaining that because cul-
tural relativists find knowledge and truth culturally contingent, they face barriers to
cross-cultural understanding); Kim, supra note 11, at 56 (premising knowledge on one's
cultural upbringing); Otto, supra note 8, at 8 (explaining that cultural relativists, who
have poststructural perspective on rights, understand that truth is contingent on cul-
ture).
42. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 95 (identifying premise of cul-
tural relativism); see also Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 242 (explaining that
cultural relativists urge majority cultures to tolerate minority practices); Kim, supra note
11, at 56 (stating that main premise of cultural relativism is that all cultures are equally
valid); Desai, supra note 10, at 809 (explaining that cultural relativists view all cultures
as equally valid).
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with culture, but to force into question any assertions of the su-
periority of one culture over another, which may result from uni-
versalist thought.4" Relativist advocates praise cultural relativism
for including and encouraging the participation of marginalized
voices. 44  Commentators thus find that relativism holds promise
for feminists who advocate listening to the many different voices
and stories of women's experiences.45
International human rights scholars explain that relativism,
applied in moderate form, cautions critics against rushing to crit-
icize other cultures.4 6 Scholars acknowledge that relativism
taken to an extreme, however, can be dangerous.47 First, radical
43. See RENTELN, supra note 40, at 66 (pointing to Marshall Herskovitz's commen-
tary on complex familial systems of Aboriginal Australians to demonstrate that cultural
relativists seek both to demonstrate that standards of morality and normalcy are culture-
bound and to call into question ethnocentric assumption of Western superiority); see
also Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 242 (discussing cultural relativists' re-
fusal to enforce majority norms); Desai, supra note 10, at 809 (linking morality with
culture and recognizing cultural validity).
44. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (recognizing that feminism,
like relativism, values listening to women's voices and increasing women's participa-
tion); Haddon, supra note 17, at 378 (recognizing that women do not speak in one
voice); Barbara Stark, Bottom Line Feminist Theory: The Dream of a Common Language, 23
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 227 (2000) (explaining that there are many feminist voices on par-
ticular issues, and therefore no one individual can speak for all feminists); Desai, supra
note 10, at 842 (urging feminists to listen to voice of Afghan woman refugee to best
help her).
45. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (stating that relativist view of
human rights is consistent with feminist theory); see also Will Kymlicka, Liberal Compla-
cencies, in Is MULTicULTURAISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14, at 31, 34 (arguing that
multiculturalism and feminism can be allied in struggle for justice that is inclusive);
Parekh, supra note 39, at 75 (arguing that multiculturalism gives women unique histori-
cal opportunities to radically transform their patriarchal cultures); Volpp, Talking Cul-
ture, supra note 24, at 1612 (advocating consideration of party's culture in criminal
cases where cultural defense is invoked, but limiting those considerations to individual's
history and community, rather than cultural stereotypes); Desai, supra note 10, at 814
(explaining that universalism can be antithetical to feminism because women who con-
done government's unequal treatment of women will be ignored).
46. SeeJACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRAcrrlcE 109-10
(1989) (categorizing relativism as either weak or radical); Higgins, Regarding Rights,
supra note 19, at 243 (asserting that strongest case for cultural claims is that they are
asserted in good faith, represent cultural consensus, and request exemption from ma-
jority conception of human rights); Kim, supra note 11, at 56 (explaining weak form of
relativism).
47. See Kim, supra note 11, at 56 (explaining strong form of relativism); see also
Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 23 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 294 (2000) (pointing to example of "Asian values" argument, which its
proponents use to argue both for and against human rights). See generally Susan Moller
Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?,
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relativism admonishes possible critics to stay out of another cul-
ture, because cultural traditions can never be wrong.4" Follow-
ing this reasoning, State actors who permit oppressive practices
can invoke culture as an excuse to justify their acts.4 9 Further-
more, scholars caution that cultural relativism can oversimplify
culture.50 Cultural relativist arguments, some critics assert, pre-
sent culture as a monolithic entity, and fail to account for intra-
group differences.5 1 Additionally, critics realize that cultural rel-
supra note 14, at 7, 9 (arguing that multiculturalism is not necessarily good for women);
Katha Pollitt, Whose Culture?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14,
at 27 (explaining how multiculturalism arguments fail); Yael Tamir, Siding with the Un-
derdogs, in Is MuLTiCULrURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14, at 47 (cautioning
against acceptance of group rights, multiculturalist arguments).
48. See DONNELLY, supra note 46, at 109-10 (defining different degrees of relativ-
ism); Engle, supra note 47, at 311 (explaining that in 1990s, non-Western States began
to articulate cultural challenge to human rights); Kim, supra note 11, at 56 (stating that
strong cultural relativists assert culture as primary source of moral rights and sufficient
reason for cultural practice).
Note that this argument is an evolved form of the U.N. Charter Article 2(7) argu-
ment of State sovereignty, which is rarely asserted anymore. See LILLICH & HANNUM,
supra note 31, at 613 (explaining that human rights protection was inadequate without
ability to act in face of Article 2(7)).
Often, the greatest advocates of cultural relativism are the leaders of oppressive
regimes, using the excuse of culture to protect their diversion of resources or mistreat-
ment of citizens. Id. at 715-24. For example, both the Isle of Mann and Singapore
defend caning as native cultural traditions. Id. at 715, 721-23.
49. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 n.97 (noting as example of
this justification that while Egyptian government dissolved Arab Women's Solidarity As-
sociation for supposed political reasons, government also stated organization offended
Islam); Ritter, supra note 31, at 72 (recognizing argument that political motives are
often used to justify oppressive practices); see also Engle, supra note 47, at 291 (arguing
that "Asian values debate" embodies controversy over essentialism).
The proponents of the "Asian values" argument criticize international human
rights advocates as perpetuating a neoliberal political agenda that hurts Third-World
countries. Id. at 292. As a result, Southeast Asian governments asserted their cultures
as a defense against this perceived imposition of Western liberal ideals. Id. This de-
fense gained popularity with Southeast Asian governments after the 1993 U.N. World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, and was borrowed from both Third-World
post-colonialist critiques and the "Eastern" stance during the Cold War. Id. Over forty
Asian States signed the Bangkok Declaration, which criticized the existing human rights
regime for ignoring Asian regional history, culture, and religious particularity. Id.
50. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 112 (cautioning that cultural rela-
tivist arguments may oversimplify complexity of culture by treating culture as mono-
lithic and moral norms within that culture as easily identifiable); Kim, supra note 11, at
86-87 (defining culture as flexible entity that contains multiple viewpoints, rather than
homogeneous, fixed, easily discernible entity); see also Okin, supra note 47, at 12 (stat-
ing that relativist approach to rights ignores intra-cultural differences).
51. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 112 (pointing to differences in
beliefs within United States concerning issues such as abortion in order to demonstrate
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ativist arguments are often applied to justify non-Western cul-
tural practices, while culture is ignored as a plausible justifica-
tion for the actions of someone from a Western culture.5 2 Thus,
commentators claim that the cultural rights argument works best
for claims concerning the practices of those cultures about
which Westerners know very little." Finally, cultural relativism
places culture in opposition to politics, which results in a pitting
of culture against rights.54
C. Placing the Debate in the Context of Women's Rights
Feminist legal theorists and international human rights
scholars recognize that the logical and practical defects apparent
in both universalism and relativism are disquieting, especially in
the context of women's rights.55 Although these flaws evidence
that members of one culture do not necessarily share same beliefs); see also Okin, supra
note 47, at 12 (stating that relativist approach to rights focuses on differences between
groups and ignores differences within group); Desai, supra note 10, at 831 (stating that
culture is constructed, and not monolithic).
52. See Pollitt, supra note 47, at 28 (asserting that multiculturalism is connected to
"Third Worldism"); Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
1181, 1183-84 (2001) [hereinafter Volpp, Multiculturalism] (urging Western feminists'
examination of non-Western women's conditions in more accurate and self-reflective
light); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense", 17
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 57, 62 (1994) (explaining that U.S. law is perceived as norm, and
country or region from where defendant came is considered culture); Farah Sultana
Brelvi, "News of the Weird": Specious Normativity and the Problem of the Cultural Defense, 28
COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 657, 682 (1997) (describing view that United States is neither
without culture nor represents norm).
53. See Pollitt, supra note 47, at 28-29 (using example that Italian immigrant in
United States could not justify beating his wife based on Italian traditions, and asserting
that cultural rights argument works best for cultures about which most American know
comparatively little); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1189 (pointing to West-
ern feminist reactions to sexual violence in immigrant communities that ignore cultural
aspects of sexual violence affecting Western white women); see also Brelvi, supra note 52,
at 661 (explaining that courts can envision monolithic Muslim culture).
54. See Engle, supra note 47, at 294-95 (observing that when States assert cultural
defense, culture is positioned against rights, rather than being affirmatively asserted as
right); Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 232 (explaining that cultural rights
are invoked as counters to political and civil rights); cf Nussbaum, Women and Work,
supra note 32 (rejecting this argument in relation to women's rights in developing
countries because groups working to improve lives of women are providing those wo-
men with means to achieving end that women assert they want).
55. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (acknowledging that both uni-
versalism and relativism are consistent with feminist theory, but stand in opposition to
one another, and therefore necessitate inquiry about how seriously feminism must take
cultural defenses); see also Kim, supra note 11, at 104 (urging feminists to adopt mul-
tiperspective approach, rather than strictly using cultural relativist or universalist ap-
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the need for a different approach to women's rights advocacy,
no uniform feminist response to cope with this friction exists. 56
Several feminists, however, recognize that the differences be-
tween Western and non-Western cultures create tensions that
U.S. and Western human rights advocates must address before
attempting to shield women in non-Western countries from
seemingly sexist practices.
1. Universalism
Critics of universalism disparage some U.S. feminists for
presumptuously attempting to assert their "enlightened" views
about how women should be treated into environments outside
the United States. 8 These notions regarding the ideal treat-
ment of women result from the evolution and projection of be-
liefs that many feminists in the United States hold, often uncon-
sciously.59 For example, critics contend that some U.S. feminists
proach); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Ethnocentrism and Feminism: Using a Contextual Meth-
odology in International Women's Rights Advocacy and Education, 28 S.U. L. Rv. 279, 279
(2001) (recognizing clash between universality and respect for culture); Desai, supra
note 10, at 830 (using example of Taliban to show limits of relativism and universalism
when applied).
56. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (stating that feminist re-
sponses to charges of relativism or universalism can be conflicting and complicated); see
also Haddon, supra note 17, at 379 (recognizing that feminists have conflicting interests
because they recognize dangers of trivializing difference and of succumbing to extreme
relativism); Desai, supra note 10, at 813 (explaining that feminists either appear to be
culturally imperialist or to condone oppressive patriarchies, and therefore face di-
lemma of how to avoid both criticisms).
57. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (recognizing that both univer-
salism and relativism possess positive and negative aspects, and acknowledging that ten-
sion between universalism and relativism exists in human rights advocacy in general,
and feminism in particular); see also Haddon, supra note 17, at 379 (recognizing tension
in feminists' task of addressing difference and subordination); Lopez, supra note 55, at
286-87 (suggesting alternative framework for women's advocacy to avoid imperialism
and to listen to women's different voices).
58. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 100 (explaining that many West-
ern feminists have expanded their political vision into non-Western world); Martha
Nussbaum, India: Implementing Sex Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 35, 57 (2001)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality] (arguing that other nations should
not act as colonialists and apply sanctions to promote sex equality in India); Volpp,
Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1602 (disparaging some Western feminists for first
constructing non-Western as "other," and then subsequently invoking notions of infer-
ior cultural practices to justify attempts to Westernize or assimilate those belonging to
"other"); Desai, supra note 10, at 810 (asserting that relativists raise threat of neo-coloni-
alism when Westerners attempt to employ universal human rights standards that stem
from Western ideology).
59. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 380 (urging feminists to promote dialogue in
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share an unconscious assumption that women in the United
States live in liberated, progressive realities, far superior to those
of non-Westerners.6" The view that Western values triumph over
non-Western values flows from this mistaken self-aggrandize-
ment, and critics assert that the disparagement of non-U.S. cul-
tural practices automatically follows.6 ' Subsequently, popular
conceptions, or misconceptions, develop to the effect that the
"other" (the non-Western woman) lives in a desperate reality.62
order to learn more about themselves, and recognize and avoid perpetuating subordi-
nation of non-Western women); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1578 (recog-
nizing Western women's discursive self-representation).
60. See Kim, supra note 11, at 100 (finding 1970s Western feminist condemnation
of female sexual surgeries to be demonstrative of some radical feminists' disregard of
validity of other cultures' practices); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1185-86
(explaining that discourse pitting feminism against multiculturalism presumes that mi-
nority cultures are more patriarchal than Western cultures); Volpp, Talking Culture,
supra note 24, at 1577 (criticizing contention that Asian and African women who immi-
grate to United States are moving to more enlightened culture from patriarchal cul-
ture).
61. See Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 57 (extolling atti-
tudes of Western politicians that draw attention to women's plight in India, but do not
condition aid on Indian government enacting specific Western ideals about treatment
of women); Otto, supra note 8, at 33 (suggesting that Western human rights advocates
recognize.their own privilege and take responsibility for their role in subordination of
non-Westerners); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1198-99 (explaining that
idea of non-Western women's desperate reality is developed in relation to Westerner's
self-perception of own enlightened and free state); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note
24, at 1577 (explaining that feminist version of racist ideology presents immigrant wo-
men as requiring liberation into progressive norms and customs of West); see also Brelvi,
supra note 52, at 657-59 (explaining that when Albanian-American asserted cultural
defense in child abuse case, U.S. courts and public considered individual Albanian and
his culture weird).
62. See Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the
Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 177, 182 (1997) (explaining
that in order to understand stereotypes about Asian Pacific American women, one must
first understand social construction of those women in United States); Volpp, Multicul-
turalism, supra note 52, at 1186 (stating that notion of suffering immigrant or Third
World woman versus liberated Western woman has strong hold on imaginations in
United States); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1573-74 (commenting on Dori-
ane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals'Di-
lemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1996), which Volpp feels represents "backlash scholar-
ship," through its U.S. ethnocentrism and rejection of race consciousness); see also
Brelvi, supra note 52, at 681 (realizing that cultural defenses can result in essentializa-
tion of culture as "other"); Desai, supra note 10, at 836 (urging feminists to truly listen
to "other" women's voices, thereby legitimizing women's voices that do not support
dominant feminist views of human rights).
The social construction of Asian women's identity perpetuated in the United States
serves as an example. Cho, supra, at 182. U.S. popular culture portrays Asian women as
the model minority. Id. at 183. Asian women are depicted as passive, servile, and obe-
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Critics further charge that U.S. feminists' assumption of U.S. cul-
tural superiority creates a hierarchy of cultures," ignores the im-
portant contexts in which non-Western women live,6 4 and im-
poses Western ideals of women's and cultural enlightenment on
non-Western women.65
As an example of U.S. feminists' misguided concern for wo-
men in "oppressive" and "patriarchal" cultures, theorists con-
sider the assumption that all non-Western women immigrants
flee non-Western cultures for a less oppressive United States,
and the dangers of that assumption.6 6 First, theorists claim that
this view ignores that U.S. culture, like non-Western culture, ex-
ists under patriarchal control. 67 The mere need for, and exis-
dient. Id. at 186. Further, Asian women are over-sexualized, in part because of their
perceived submissiveness. Id. Western feminists may project these mistaken portrayals
onto their understanding of Asian women's situations, and therefore may find Asian
women's immigration to the United States attributable to the patriarchal and anti-wo-
man nature of their native cultures. Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577.
63. See Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1186-87 (recognizing that Wes-
terners consider violence against women in West aberrational, whereas violence against
women in non-Western countries is considered part of non-Western cultures); Volpp,
Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (disparaging view that non-Western women who
immigrate to United States are entering more enlightened culture because that per-
spective implies non-Western cultures are patriarchal); see also Brelvi, supra note 52, at
682 (arguing that U.S. culture functions as norm, and becomes non-culture, when jux-
taposed with non-Western culture of defendant asserting cultural defense).
64. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 116 (cautioning against accusing
those who disagree with Western norms as falsely conscious); Volpp, Talking Culture,
supra note 24, at 1602 (stating that West constructs non-West as primitive "other," de-
fines itself as progressive and liberal, and justifies colonialism and imperialism); Desai,
supra note 10, at 835 (asserting that listening to women's voices includes crediting sto-
ries that women who disagree with Western norms tell).
65. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (recognizing that these femi-
nists want to extend rights Westerners consider fundamental, such as right to marry and
divorce and right to own property, to women everywhere, despite cultural and religious
prohibitions); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1604 (calling this practice "epi-
stemic violence").
66. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (criticizing Westerners that
feel non-Western women come to enlightened United States to escape patriarchal cul-
ture); see also Hope Lewis, Universal Mother: Transnational Migration and the Human
Rights of Black Women in the Americas, 5J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 197, 230-31 (2001) (citing
movement of women from South America to North America as example of journey
characterized as movement from backward culture to freedom and enlightenment);
Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1187 (comparing violence against women in
both Western and non-Western countries as another example of assuming United
States is safer and less patriarchal than non-Western countries).
67. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 386 (arguing that Westerners ignore inconsisten-
cies in their advocacy and actuality); Kim, supra note 11, at 49 (stating that oppression
exists in United States); Lewis, supra note 66, at 230 (explaining that culture-based deci-
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tence of, an American feminist movement provides sufficient evi-
dence to prove this condition.68 Second, theorists observe that
this assumption contributes to the construction of a false opposi-
tion: feminism is Western, and patriarchy is non-Western.69 In
actuality, feminism and patriarchy exist in Western and non-
Western settings.7" Finally, theorists disparage the above pro-
position as negatively impacting cross-cultural relationships be-
cause it implies that non-Western cultures are backwards and op-
pressive.7" Theorists charge that this view of non-Western wo-
men's choices provides justifications for Western imperialism
and racial subordination,72 and further polarizes Western and
sions are attributed to women in West only when they are immigrant, non-Western
women); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1187 (recognizing that violence
against women occurs in United States, but is not viewed as cultural problem). See gener-
ally Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24 (arguing that U.S. feminists ignore their own
oppression when analyzing that of other women).
68. See Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1189 (stating that cultural aspects
of sexual violence affect Western white women, and asserting that Westerners some-
times fail to recognize this); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1578 n.25 (claim-
ing that need for feminist movements in West demonstrates that Western women's em-
powerment is not reality).
69. See Kim, supra note 11, at 49 (recognizing that feminism is not only present in
West); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1193 (asserting that feminism exists in
communities of color); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (explaining as-
sumptions of some liberal feminists that African and Asian cultures are male-defined
and patriarchal, while feminists are "Western" and "American").
70. See Kim, supra note 11, at 94 (asserting that burgeoning women's rights move-
ment exists around world); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (criticizing
liberal feminists for ignoring reality that Western culture can be patriarchal, and non-
Westerners can be feminists); Desai, supra note 10, at 834 (acknowledging women of
color and Third World women's feminist scholarship); see also Volpp, Multiculturalism,
supra note 52, at 1203 (criticizing universalist versus relativist discourse, in which femi-
nism represents rights, multiculturalism represents culture, and both terms exclude
each other).
71. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577 (explaining that this view can
result in outdated feminism that is imperialistic); see also Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra
note 52, at 1189 (explaining that Third World becomes site of.monstrosity and en-
tertainment for Westerners). See generally Brelvi, supra note 52 (arguing that non-West-
ern cultures are viewed as strange in U.S. courts when cultural defense is asserted).
72. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 379 (recognizing potential for imperialism and
ignoring one's perpetuation of subordination in cross-cultural advocacy); Kim, supra
note 11, at 60 (explaining that relativists attack feminism as culturally imperialistic);
Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1191 (explaining that feminism versus mul-
ticulturalism discourse relies on idea that minority cultures are sexist, static entities);
Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1602 (stating that scholars have discredited
idea that certain cultures are more advanced as racist, especially when used to justify
colonialism).
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non-Western countries.73
Disregarding such dangers, critics warn, can result in femi-
nism that is imperialistic and racist, not only because it creates a
hierarchy of culture, but also because it automatically privileges
women's rights over culture."4 .Furthermore, critics caution that
favoring Western ideals demonstrates the universalist attitude
that certain innate human rights transcend the boundaries of a
particular cultural mandate that may stand in opposition to a
universally accepted norm.75 Thus, critics explain that universal-
ists find a culture that does not grant or believe in a certain
human right as serving to deny its members a fundamental
human entitlement. 76
According to critics of universalism, U.S. feminists should
recognize that universalism fails to represent all women because
it is innately essentialist. 77 Essentialism is the idea that there is a
common attribute all women share, regardless of race, class, sex-
73. See Kim, supra note 11, at 100 (describing how some African feminists are
forced to choose between certain African cultures, which practice female sexual sur-
gery, and Western feminism, which condemns female sexual surgery); Volpp, Talking
Culture, supra note 24, at 1590 (using discussion of People v. Moua, in which Hmong
woman who lived and worked in California was raped, to explain that one is considered
American when she assimilates, separating herself from her ethnic identity and family
ties).
74. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1580 (describing how liberal femi-
nists pit culture against women's rights, and then embrace gender consciousness,
thereby rejecting race or culture consciousness); Desai, supra note 10, at 814 (asserting
importance of cultural context in determining rights). But see Volpp, Multiculturalism,
supra note 52, at 1183 (arguing that positing feminism against multiculturalism is pre-
mised on faulty logic).
75. See Desai, supra note 10, at 814 (explaining that universalist feminist theory
would view any violation of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women ("CEDAW") as violating women's human rights, even without con-
ducting examination of particular woman's culture); see also Higgins, Anti-Essentialism,
supra note 6, at 107 (critiquing non-self-reflective universalist masking of its own under-
lying normative standards); Haddon, supra note 17, at 380 (finding universalist consen-
sus about moral standards potentially dangerous because such agreement about moral
norms can undermine Western feminist's self-reflection about her own culture's moral-
ity systems and norms).
76. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 107 (explaining that State that
enforces what it feels are universally accepted fundamental rights may attempt to force
other States to enforce same rights); see also Kim, supra note 11, at 57 (noting that
Western States argued for recognition of civil and political rights' primary importance,
even though non-Western States prioritize social and economic rights).
77. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 387 (explaining that universalist feminists ex-
clude and essentialize experiences of women of color in United States); Volpp, Multicul-
turalism, supra note 52, at 1199 (explaining that constructing unitary woman ignores
other sources of women's oppression, such as racism and poverty); Desai, supra note 10,
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ual orientation, or other personal situations.7 8 Since essential-
ism is inherent in universalist feminist goals of cross-cultural
unity, critics explain that universalism often ignores the voices of
women who live in societies that those in the United States find
oppressive. 79 A system that recognizes only one voice can pro-
duce very few responses to the experience of oppression.8"
Thus, commentators urge U.S. feminists working on behalf of
women within the global context to respect women's different
voices to take successful and productive collective action.81
2. Cultural Relativism
Conversely, scholars explain that other U.S. feminists, eager
to listen to all women's voices, may accept that cultural norms
justify the treatment of Women living within that culture.82
at 815 (explaining that universalism ignores real differences between women, and in-
cludes only voices of most privileged women).
78. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 86 (1999)
(defining essentialism); Haddon, supra note 17, at 387 (asserting that universalism ig-
nores women's intersecting and influential identities); Desai, supra note 10, at 815 (de-
claring notion of women's common oppression as. illusory because of differences
among women).
79. See CHAMALLAs, supra note 78, at 86 (describing failed National Women's Stud-
ies Association 1990 annual meeting, in which many U.S. feminists were accused of
essentialism); Haddon, supra note 17, at 381 (advocating consciousness-raising concern-
ing voices of all types of women); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1199 (assert-
ing that gender oppression is contingent on diverse contexts shaping woman's experi-
ence); Desai, supra note 10, at 815 (explaining that asserting notion of women's com-
mon oppression results in ignoring real differences existing among women).
80. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 102 (commenting that essentialist
approaches to women's issues allow only few privileged voices to define feminist
agenda); Lopez, supra note 55, at 287 (promoting critical race feminist ideology that
supports women of color and Third World women defining how to improve their own
lives); Desai, supra note 10, at 815 (explaining that valuing individual women's voices
allows creation of effective solutions to women's issues).
81. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 86 (acknowledging that tension between uni-
versalist and relativist thought reflects tension within feminism itself between describing
women's experience to take political action and respecting differences among women);
Haddon, supra note 17, at 378 (asserting that women do not speak in one voice, as anti-
essentialist feminist writings evidence); see Kim, supra note 11, at 88 (espousing recon-
ception of women's human rights that includes women's actual experiences of oppres-
sion); see Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra note 52, at 1217-18 (urging new strategies and
possibilities for collective action on behalf of women); Desai, supra note 10, at 814 (ex-
plaining that feminists who attempt to employ Western ideology in non-Western cul-
tures are cultural imperialists who fail to respect difference).
82. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 103 (drawing parallel between
anti-essentialist feminist theory and cultural relativism, and recognizing that both lead
to conclusion that gender inequality cannot be explained across cultures); Haddon,
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These scholars note that feminism and multicultural acceptance,
however, are not always effortlessly reconcilable entities.8"
Rather, scholars recognize that the cultural defense is often in-
voked in situations that involve male control over women. 84 Fur-
ther, many State actors who invoke culture as a defense admit
that they engage in some cultural practices specifically to control
women, one of their culture's aims.85 Scholars therefore warn
that relativism may allow women's oppressors to defend harmful,
patriarchal acts with claims that cultural norms support, if not
mandate, their actions.8 6
Critics assert that advocates of a relativist approach should
also recognize that State representatives who cite cultural justifi-
cations for oppressive practices may not represent the desires of
supra note 17, at 379 (acknowledging that feminists working in human rights arenas
may be subject to paralyzing relativism); Desai, supra note 10, at 811 (describing relativ-
ism, in part, as preoccupation with difference).
83. See Okin, supra note 47, at 10 (stating that people who are politically progres-
sive have been too quick to assume that muticulturalism and feminism are both good
things that are easily reconciled); Otto, supra note 8, at 13-14 (arguing that cultural
arguments can protect patriarchal goals); Desai, supra note 10, at 812 (recognizing that
listening to different voices is insufficient because culture can subordinate women, and
therefore advocating examination of women's systemic subordination in male-domi-
nated societies).
84. See Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 243 (explaining that States can
invoke culture to mask oppression of women); Okin, supra note 47, at 18 (discussing
non-Western criminals' use of cultural defense in their American trials to justify oppres-
sion of women, and how those defenses result in reduced sentences for crimes against
women, and subsequent reinforcement of practices that oppress women); Otto, supra
note 8, at 13 (explaining that States can use culture to disguise true, patriarchal
agenda).
85. See Kim, supra note 11, at 92 (noting that male-controlled governments stifle
women's choices); Okin, supra note 47, at 13-14 (noting that many cultures are not
overt in their sex discrimination because they aim to control women in private sphere);
Otto, supra note 8, at 13 (explaining that cultural arguments serve to protect gender
status quo).
Since these practices often deal with the private sphere, such as family life and
customs related to gender, the West is more willing to make accommodations for cul-
tural justifications. See Pollitt, supra note 47, at 29. To illustrate how this accommoda-
tion may differ if one asserts cultural defenses to justify actions taken in the public
realms to which the West assigns higher value, one commentator asks how far an Alge-
rian immigrant would get in the United States if he refused to pay the interest on his
credit card bill because Islam forbids interest on borrowed money. Id.
86. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 (recognizing that State actors
invoke culture to justify oppression of women); Otto, supra note 8, at 14 (noting that
States advocating cultural relativism want to avoid international scrutiny of their re-
gimes); Desai; supra note 10, at 813 (cautioning that cultural relativist feminists stand in
danger of condoning oppressive patriarchal structures).
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either the culture's female members, or the culture's majority
sentiment.8 7 Men will surely serve as the representatives for a
culture that endorses male control over women.88 Thus, the ac-
tors articulating a culture's beliefs and practices will not be wo-
men. 9 Additionally, critics fear that those beliefs and practices
will most likely fail to reflect the concerns and desires of those
within the culture who do not support those cultural practices
that oppress women.9 °
D. The Middle Ground
The above debate places feminists working for human rights
in a quandary, working to take both arguments of cultural differ-
ence and of universal women's oppression seriously.91 Address-
ing this quandary, human rights scholar Professor Tracy E. Hig-
gins poses the question: How can feminists, with varying ideolo-
gies, cultures, and desires, work collectively to determine, and
ultimately achieve, global political goals in the face of women's
87. See Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 243 (advising that women's ad-
vocates question who asserts cultural defenses and true reason that cultural defenses are
asserted); Kim, supra note 11, at 90-91 (arguing that essentialist view of culture ignores
contributions of women in particular society); Tamir, supra note 47, at 51 (asserting
that members of culture should be ones who determine fate of that culture).
88. See Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 243 (supporting investigation of
who is entitled to speak for dissenting communities); Kim, supra note 11, at 90 (assert-
ing that men comprise majority of power elite in almost every society); Okin, supra note
47, at 12 (asserting that in culture where men clearly have more power than women,
men will be decision-makers who determine and articulate cultural practices and be-
liefs); Desai, supra note 10, at 815 (acknowledging that holders of power determine
what constitutes rights for women).
89. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 (cautioning that relativists
may too readily accept cultural defenses that State actors who are not women articu-
late); Kim, supra note 11, at 90 (explaining that women's opinions and choices are
ignored in male-dominated cultures); Desai, supra note 10, at 815 (recognizing that
women do not hold power in most societies, and therefore do not make decisions about
women's rights).
90. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 113 (stating that it is unlikely that
State-offered cultural defenses will adequately reflect changing, and possibly conflict-
ing, cultural concerns of its citizens); Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 242
(urging feminists to examine legitimacy of religious and cultural group claims); Kim,
supra note 11, at 91-92 (recognizing importance of subordinated groups' participation
in political process to avoid injustice).
91. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 105 (urging feminists to recog-
nize cultural differences, without abandoning ability to criticize women's oppression);
Otto, supra note 8, at 15 (stating that debate between relativism and universalism diverts
attention from pressing issues); Desai, supra note 10, at 816 (explaining that feminism
has embraced both universalism and relativism).
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cultural differences? 9 2 In struggling to figure out how feminists
can work together, human rights scholars suggest making a com-
promise between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism.9
These scholars urge U.S. feminists to first acknowledge the dif-
ferent forces shaping women's voices, experiences, and wishes,"
while remaining wary of imperialism and relativism when work-
ing for, or examining, women's rights in other countries.9 5 Fur-
ther, U.S. feminists should examine their own environment with
a critical eye, recognizing the weaknesses and strengths of their
own culture, and the influences affecting their perceptions.96
Scholars advocating new approaches to cross-cultural wo-
men's advocacy maintain that context plays a crucial role in
92. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 89 (asking how, in light of
profound cultural differences among women, feminists can maintain global political
movement and simultaneously avoid charges of cultural imperialism); see also Higgins,
Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 232 (questioning how international human rights
discourse fares in face of critiques of universalism and cultural relativism).
93. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 379 (suggesting compromise between universal-
ism and relativism); Otto, supra note 8, at 43 (suggesting transformative strategy that
refuses singular definition of woman while recognizing power of universal law); Desai,
supra note 10, at 806 (suggesting that feminists take alternative to either/or discourse
of feminism and apply both universalist and relativist principles to make informed deci-
sions). See generally Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6 (exploring question of how
to compromise between universalism and cultural relativism).
94. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 380 (recognizing dangers of ignoring women's
voices and needs); Otto, supra note 8, at 43 (urging feminists to adopt transformative
rights strategy that does not ignore or silence languages of need, community, and eco-
nomic justice); Desai, supra note 10, at 838 (asserting that feminism must conceptualize
women's rights through multilayered; multivoiced category of woman). See generally
Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479 (1994)
[hereinafter Abrams, Complex Female Subject] (surveying recent U.S. judicial decisions to
determine whether courts acknowledge, and respect, complex nature of woman as sub-
ject).
95. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 126 (concluding that feminists
must forge hybrid strategy that respects commonality and difference); Haddon, supra
note 17, at 379 (recognizing that challenge for human rights proponents is negotiating
problems of both relativism and universalism in advocacy); Otto, supra note 8, at 31-33
(urging feminists to adopt transformative dialogue to make advocacy across cultures
more effective and less imperialistic); Desai, supra note 10, at 816 (acknowledging im-
portance of both relativism and universalism for achieving feminist goals).
96. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1616 (encouraging feminists to
abandon ethnocentric ideas of Western and U.S. superiority and recognize that all cul-
tures and communities have patriarchal and anti-patriarchal aspects); Haddon, supra
note 17, at 380 (stating that dialogue helps feminists learn more about themselves and
how they may perpetuate oppression, and therefore helps feminists successfully build
coalitions to address oppression); Otto, supra note 8, at 34 (urging Western feminists to
recognize their privilege and, after that recognition of power, rethink their positions).
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cross-cultural advocacy and critique.97 As criticism of essentialist
Western feminists indicates, Western feminists do not live in
ideal conditions, free from patriarchy.9" Feminists from the
United States advocating in the global arena, however, may fail
to acknowledge the difficulties their fellow country-women face,
while emphasizing the hardship of their non-Western counter-
parts.99 Thus, critics accuse these U.S. feminists of falling prey to
the false consciousness 00 they attribute, to women in non-West-
ern countries suffering from gender-based harassment. 1' To
remedy this flaw, commentators suggest that feminists from the
United States search their own lives and experiences to under-
stand how their culturally specific gender roles, and other per-
sonal identities, such as race, can bias their perspectives. 10 2 If all
feminists, Western and non-Western, explore their cultures and
the sources of their consciousness, women may begin to find
97. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 91 (advocating close look at par-
ticular conditions of specific women); Lopez, supra note 55, at 283 (proposing method
of comparative analysis that contextualizes analysis of women's issues, thereby respect-
ing culture); Desai, supra note 10, at 814-15 (stating that some critics find feminism and
relativism compatible because both force scrutiny of women's voices and women-s true
conditions).
98. See Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1577-79 (critiquing essentialized
assumptions about women from Third World); Haddon, supra note 17, at 379-80 (as-
serting that problems of violence and abuse are not local, non-Western problems); see
also Otto, supra note 8, at 36 (explaining that rethinking feminist strategy involves re-
jecting notions of solidarity based narrowly on geography and identity).
99. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 380 (suggesting that Western feminists should
recognize their role in perpetuating subordination); Otto, supra note 8, at 46 (stating
that transformative strategies of human rights advocacy necessitate individual recogni-
tion of responsibility for participating in power relations); Volpp, Multiculturalism, supra
note 52, at 1198-99 (explaining that Western feminists unrealistically disregard their
own oppression when describing non-Western women's oppression).
100. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Method and Politics, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THE-
ORY OF THE STATE 106, 122 (1989) (identifying false consciousness of women living
under patriarchy) [hereinafter MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE].
101. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 390 (stating that dialogues about hearing wo-
men's voice force exploration of one's own cultural attitudes and privilege, and there-
fore force true questioning about meaning of equality); Kim, supra note 11, at 99 (ex-
plaining how radical feminists are guilty of false consciousness in international human
rights context).
102. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 120 (advising Western feminists
to examine their own cultural texts, which are sometimes conflicting); Haddon, supra
note 17, at 381 (encouraging all feminists, especially Western feminists, to share per-
sonal experiences and self-reflect); Otto, supra note 8, at 32-33 (advocating self-reflec-
tion, open dialog, and rethinking of own dominant societal structures); Volpp, Multicul-
turalism, supra note 52, at 1198-99 (criticizing Western feminists' blind disregard of
their own oppression and culture).
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commonalities that not only unite them, but aid in their struggle
to distinguish oppressive practices from acceptable cultural
norms.1"' Just as ideals widely held in the United States do not
have to represent modernity and civility, multiculturalism does
not have to be antithetical to feminism. 10
4
II. DEVELOPING THE ISSUE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
Sexual harassment has existed in the United States and in
India for as long as women in both countries have participated
in the workplace.1" 5 The U.S. courts, however, failed to recog-
nize that sexual harassment constituted a form of sex discrimina-
tion until 1976.116 Similarly, the Indian judiciary has only re-
cently implemented anti-sexual harassment protections.
1 0 7
A. Sexual Harassment Law in the United States
The problem of workplace sexual harassment has existed
throughout U.S. history. 108 Although legislation fighting sex-
103. See Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 6, at 120 (urging critical exploration
of differences to better understand gender hierarchies of each culture); Haddon, supra
note 17, at 380 (promoting dialog to learn more about self and others to build coali-
tions against oppression); Otto, supra note 8, at 32 (advocating meaningful feminist
dialog); see also Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at 1616 (clarifying, in her discus-
sion of identity and asylum, that she is not calling for end to gender-based asylum, but is
instead suggesting that other, less stereotypical narratives can be used to win women
asylum).
104. See Haddon, supra note 17, at 390 (advocating listening to voices of women
from all cultures as effective feminist advocacy); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 24, at
1616 (deeming this perceived polarity of multiculturalism and feminism false opposi-
tion); Desai, supra note 10, 816 (asserting that feminism's major goals require approach
to women's rights that incorporates relativistic respect for differences).
105. See KIRRv SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE,
1600 TO 1993, at 160-61 (1994) (reporting great degree of sexual harassment profes-
sional Indian women suffer at work and detailing history of sexual harassment in work-
place); ROSEMARIE SKAINE, POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND HAR-
ASSMENT 31-55 (1996) (tracing history of sexual harassment in workplaces in United
States from colonial period to present day); Bhandare et al., supra note 5 (quoting
survey concerning great degree of sexual harassment in Indian workplace); see also
Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (explaining cultural forces contributing to
sexual harassment of Indian women). See generally Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25
(studying problem of sexual harassment in Indian workplace).
106. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing that sexual
harassment is form of sex discrimination).
107. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (establishing anti-sexual harassment guidelines to
fight workplace sexual harassment).
108. See SKAINE, supra note 105, at 31-55 (detailing sexual harassment in U.S. work-
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based workplace discrimination was passed in 1964, U.S. courts
failed to acknowledge that sexual harassment constituted sex dis-
crimination until 1976.'09 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme
Court has issued decisions clarifying both the nature of the be-
havior that qualifies as sexual harassment at work," 0 and the ex-
tent of employer liability for workplace sexual harassment.11'
1. Origins
Sexual harassment began as soon as women in the United
States entered the workplace, and has persisted throughout all
stages of U.S. history and economic development. 112 Historians
explain that during slavery, black women slaves suffered sexual
harassment and exploitation at the hands of white male slave-
holders." 3 Men continued to sexually harass working women
place from colonial period through present day). See generally SEGRAVE, supra note 105
(detailing history of sexual harassment in workplace).
109. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 654 (finding sexual harassment qualifies as sex discrimi-
nation).
110. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that creating hostile work
environment constitutes illegal sex discrimination); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (determining sexual harassment case using objective and subjec-
tive standard).
111. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that em-
ployers can be held liable for supervisor conduct); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that employers can be held liable for supervisor
conduct).
112. See SKAINE, supra note 105, at 31-55 (detailing U.S. history of sexual harass-
ment at work); see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1169, 1195-97 (1998) [hereinafter Abrams, New Jurisprudence] (recog-
nizing sexual harassment as male response to entrance of women into traditionally all-
male workplaces); Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?" Women in the New York City
Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 21, 25 (1990) (explaining that women throughout U.S. history have faced sexual
harassment); Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restau-
rant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 163 (1997) (calling
women's workplace presence historical workplace hazard).
113. See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN 40 (1978) (stating that black women in
United States first began to suffer sexual harassment as slaves); SEGRAvE, supra note 105,
at 16-17 (asserting rampant abuse of female slaves in United States); see also Angela
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 598-99 (1990)
(discussing commonplace occurrence of white slave holders raping black women, and
lack of recourse that slave had because white man's rape of black woman was not con-
sidered crime).
Several academics point out the importance of recognizing that women of differ-
ent backgrounds and identities have historically different experiences with workplace
sexual harassment and sexual abuse in general. See Harris, supra, at 598-600 (analyzing
black women's experience of rape and U.S. rape laws' failure to adequately protect
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during the U.S. industrial revolution in the late nineteenth-cen-
tury, when women's workforce participation increased dramati-
cally.114 Historians note that when the corporate business form
emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, women who
worked in sex-segregated white-collar jobs had to answer to male
supervisors, who took advantage of their positions of power to
harass women subordinates.'1 5  In recent years, sexual harass-
ment cases featured in the news, such as the Hill-Thomas hear-
ings, 1 6 PaulaJones' allegations of sexual harassment against for-
black women in order to demonstrate how feminist discourse fails to recognize com-
plex experience of black women); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Inter-
section of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist The-
ory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149 (1989) (asserting many ways
that black women's experience of discrimination is result of several oppressive forces);
bell hooks, Reflections on Race and Sex, inYEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLIT-
ics 57, 57-64 (1989) (discussing overlap between race and sex, and asserting that this
overlap is most apparent in how both black and white men treated black women); Jenny
Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National
Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIm WORLD LJ. 231, 233 (1994) (arguing that
differences of race, gender, and national origin influence how Latinas experience do-
mestic violence).
114. See STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY 41 (1996) (recognizing that expansion of capitalism, combined with tech-
nological innovations, provided new job opportunities for unskilled workers, and there-
fore, young women, including many immigrants, began to enter occupations outside
home); see also Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 12 LAB. LAw. 291, 305-06 (1996) (stating that sexual harassment is old
phenomenon, dating back to nineteenth century); Eleanore K. Bratton, The Eye of the
Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Exam of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17
N.M. L. REv. 91, 95 (1987) (acknowledging prevalence of sexual harassment at end of
nineteenth century); Jill L. Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Dis-
tance Traveled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 445, 449 (1981) (noting preva-
lence of sexual harassment in nineteenth century). See generally Sara McLean, Confided
to His Care or Protection: The Late Nineteenth-Centuy Crime of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 9
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 47 (1999) (arguing that sexual harassment existed as both act
and legal claim in nineteenth-century United States).
115. See MOREWITZ, supra note 114, at 55 (explaining how development of suburbs
and growth of corporations resulted in greater sexual harassment of working women);
SEGRAVE, supra note 105, at 103-22 (discussing situation of female clerical workers at
turn of century); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 175-76 (1979) (describing women's exper-
iences in white-collar environments at turn of century).
116. See MOREWITZ, supra note 114, at 371-82 (describing sexual harassment to
which Clarence Thomas subjected Anita Hill, who worked under him at Department of
Education and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings that ensued because of Hill's charges when President Bush Sr.
nominated Thomas for U.S. Supreme Court); see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692 (1998) (stating that Thomas-Hill contro-
versy was first sexual harassment case to garner widespread public attention); R.W. Ap-
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mer President Clinton,117 and the Tailhook scandal,118 serve to
demonstrate that sexual harassment continues to be a problem
facing women in the United States.119
ple, Jr., On Thomas: More Questions, Not Fewer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A3 (explain-
ing that Hill's allegations raised questions about Thomas' nomination); Felicity Bar-
rigner, Hill's Case Is Divisive to Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at Al (explaining that
women in United States have very different reactions to, and beliefs about, Anita Hill's
truthfulness); Anna Quindlen, The Perfect Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A6 (argu-
ing that even though accuser may be extremely credible, like Hill, he or she will be
discredited); Peter T. Kilborn, Men Say Worry About Harassment Leads Them to Tone Down
Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al (stating that men interviewed say they are
toning down their workplace behavior as result of Hill-Thomas hearings); Sheryl Mc-
Carthy, Message Is Clear: Man Won, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 1991, at 7 (asserting that although
she is not pleased with Thomas's ultimate naming as Supreme Court Justice, hearings
exposed United States to reality that African-Americans are successful lawyers and busi-
ness-people); Martin Tolchin, Hearings End as They Began: On a Note of Confrontation,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al (describing testy attitude and remarks of Senators).
117. See MolEWITZ, supra note 114, at 390-94 (describing sexual harassment allega-
tions Paula Jones made against President Clinton, and President's subsequent re-
sponse). Many newspaper articles covered the Jones-Clinton scandal. See generally The
PaulaJones Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 7, 1994, at A18; Richard Cohen, Bill Clinton's Anita
Hill, WASH. POST, May 5, 1992, at A23; Michael Isikoff, Clinton Hires Lawyer as Sexual
Harassment Suit Is Threatened; Former State Employee in Arkansas Alleges Improper Advance in
1991, WASH. POST, May 4,1994, at Al; Anna Quindlen, A Tale of Two Women, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1994, at Al; William Safire, Presume Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at AS.
118. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1693 (describing sexual harassment women
suffered at Tailhook Association's 1991 convention); Hilton Bars Aviator Group Tied to
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1992, at A5 (reporting hotel chain's decision to bar
Tailhook Association's reservations through 1996); Eric Schmitt, Citing Scandal, Navy
Group Cancels Annual Convention, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at B1 (describing decision
to cancel convention because of sexual harassment scandal); Eric Schmitt, Officials Say
Navy Tried to Soften Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at Al (reporting that Navy officials
tried to soften Tailhook sexual harassment reports to avoid offending the public); Eric
Schmitt, Senior Navy Officers Suppressed Sex Investigation, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1992, at Al (describing report Pentagon made public about horribly misconducted
Tailhook investigation) ;James Webb, Witch Hunt in the Navy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at
A2 (explaining Navy's leadership problems resulting from Tailhook scandal).
119. See MOREWITZ, supra note 114, at 395-98 (recognizing influence that cases and
scandals in United States involving sexual harassment influenced politics of, and public
opinion about, sexual harassment); David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of
Sexual Harassment on Job Satisfaction, Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 594, 597 (1998) (discussing high incidence of sexual harass-
ment at law firms); Lucetta Pope, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sexual Harass-
ment But Were Too Politically Correct to Ask (Or, the Use and Abuse of "But For" Analysis in
Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII), 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 253, 253 (2001) (recognizing
that sexual harassment has taken permanent residence in both U.S. culture and laws).
Reported incidents of sexual harassment have grown exponentially. BAR"ARA T.
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SExuAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 478 (Supp.
1999) [hereinafter LINDEMANN SUPP.]. In 1991, women in the United States filed 6,883
sexual harassment complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Id. By 1998, the number of complaints filed reached 15,618. Id. Additionally, sexual
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Sexual harassment began, and continues to occur, as a reac-
tion to women's presence in the workplace, which challenged
accepted gender roles and workplace interactions. z1 2  First, com-
mentators note that women working in the public sphere under-
mined the traditional notion that a woman's jobs included only
the roles of wife, mother, and homemaker.1 21 Additionally, his-
torians observe that the ideal Victorian woman was passive and
discreet; she did not possess the aggressive personality and the
strong, competent mind that workplace participation was
thought to require.1 22 Stereotypically, the traditional passive wo-
man also symbolized a sexual object for men. 12 3 Finally, scholars
harassment pervades both public-and private-sector jobs. See generally U.S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE (1995).
For example, the U.S. Merit Systems Board administered a survey in 1995 to which
forty-four percent of the female federal government employees surveyed reported ex-
periencing sexual harassment in the previous two years. Id. at 13-14. Moreover, twenty-
two percent of survey respondents who worked in the private sector believe women
working in the private sector experience even more harassment. Id. at 19.
120. See FARLEY, supra note 113, at 28-29 (discussing women's workplace entrance);
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1989) (recognizing that men enjoy hegemonic power over
social meanings because they are dominant in society, and can therefore label as "dif-
ferent" qualities and characteristics of or associated with women); see also Schultz, supra
note 116, at 1721-32, (describing women's entrance into traditionally male jobs and
subsequent male reaction).
121. See FARLEY, supra note 113, at 30 (explaining that men in unions tried to con-
fine women to traditional women's jobs upon their workplace entrance at turn-of-cen-
tury); MOREWITZ, supra note 114, at 51 (stating that Victorian ideal of femininity viewed
women as moral champions of home); SEGRAVE, supra note 105, at 42 (explaining that
women who entered workplace during Industrial Revolution were sometimes consid-
ered lacking traditional female morality).
One expert notes that an argument about female propriety and the workplace can
easily become a class-based argument, as well as a sexist one. See Schultz, supra note
116, at 1732. Working-class women are less likely to be perceived as "pure," and have
often worked outside the home in jobs that are not considered lady-like. Id.
122. See FARLEY, supra note 113, at 34-35 (discussing Victorian ideals of woman-
hood); MOREWITZ, supra note 114, at 143 (comparing women's societally-dictated role
with that of men, who are supposed to be aggressive in workplace); see also Mary Ann
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 72 (1995) (explaining that characteristics
associated with women, like being unaggressive and unassertive, are considered inap-
propriate for certain jobs, especially traditionally masculine jobs); Nina L. Colwill, Men
and Women in Organizations: Roles and Status, Stereotypes and Power, in WORKING WOMEN:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 97, 99 (Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) (explain-
ing relationship between traditional sex roles and traditional workplace roles for wo-
men and men).
123. See MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 100, at 122 (asserting that,
in man's eyes, woman is sex object); FARLEY, supra note 113, at 171 (discussing woman's
2002] THE SPECTRUM OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ADVOCACY 1233
conclude that women in the formerly-exclusively male work
world represented both a threat to male workplace culture and
interaction, 12  and greater competition for jobs. 25  Thus, wo-
men at work threatened many men. 126
Sexual harassment functioned as a method through which
men could confront this increasing "threat," and control female
labor.127  In her groundbreaking book, 28 Sexual Harassment of
historical role as sex object and sexual slave to fulfill men's desire); Kim, supra note 11,
at 50 (explaining feminism's goal to shift focus on woman as object to woman as sub-
ject); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1717 (recognizing that harassment plays on stereotypi-
cal role of woman as sex object).
124. See MOREW1TZ, supra note 114, at 143 (explaining that male groups in work
setting reinforced sex roles and that women's workplace presence affected and hin-
dered male workplace interactions that contributed to development of these sex roles);
see also FARLEY, supra note 113, at 32 (explaining that female workplace presence
threatened male union members, who therefore tried to teach young boys, rather than
adult women, necessary workplace skills); SEGRAvE, supra note 105, at 140-73 (describ-
ing male sexually harassing behavior towards women who entered traditionally male
fields); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1729 (explaining that U.S. courts are more willing to
apply sexual harassment protections to those women who are "proper" victims than to
those women who fail to meet societal standards prescribing suitable behavior for wo-
men; stating that courts' sexual paternalism is deeply conservative because its benefits
are limited to women perceived as sexually pure and deserving of protection).
A case that exemplifies how a woman who acted bolder, received less court protec-
tion because her attitude implied a level of welcomeness is Reed v. Shepherd, 939 F.2d
484 (7th Cir. 1991). In Reed the court denied the plaintiff relief because it interpreted
her use of profanity, her off-color jokes, her flirting, and her failure to wear a bra as
signifying her welcoming the behavior to which she was subjected. See id. at 486; Sch-
ultz, supra note 116, at 1730 (analyzing Reed case).
125. See FARLEY, supra note 113, at 33 (explaining early union efforts to enforce job
sex-segregation, and curtail workplace competition from women); MoREwiTz, supra
note 114, at 50 (recognizing that male workers feared economic competition from wo-
men workers); Colwill, supra note 122, at 104 (describing how men reinforce their
workplace status and power when women intrude into workplace, which men perceive
as their territory).
126. See FARLEY, supra note 113, at 29 (recognizing that men sought to weaken
women's workplace position and acted to reinforce sex-segregation in job market);
MoREwrrZ, supra note 114, at 51 (acknowledging that women represented threat to U.S.
family structure and values, as well as greater competition for jobs); Schultz, supra note
116, at 1687 (asserting that men put forth image that their jobs require masculine mas-
tery to undermine women's ability to do same work).
127. See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 1 ("Sexual harassment, most broadly de-
fined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of power derived from
one social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another."); see also FARLEY,
supra note 113, at 34 (asserting that sexual harassment of working women partially re-
sulted from capitalism's rise and new methods developed to control female labor);
MoRtEWITZ, supra note 114, at 50 (stating that male fear of economic competition from
women represents factor accounting for sexual harassment in workplace).
128. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (noting that
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Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination,129 Professor Catha-
rine MacKinnon 13 argued that sexual harassment is a form of
employment discrimination in which a male imposes his authori-
tative and economic muscle to discriminate against women in
the workplace. 13' Professor MacKinnon asserted that social
power roles assigned to the sexes, including those found in the
workplace, express an inequality between men and women that
is constructed through sexual relations, asserting men's domi-
nance and women's subordination. 13 2 Sexual harassment be-
comes a "normal" manifestation of society's sexual power ine-
qualities, just in a different form. 133
Professor MacKinnon recognized that a legislator crafting
sexual harassment laws could truly help women in the workplace
if she addressed the real source of sexual harassment: power dis-
parities between men and, women. 1 4 According to Professor
terms "hostile work environment"' and "quid pro quo" first appeared in Professor MacK-
innon's book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination); see also
Madhavi Sunder, In a "Fragile Space": Sexual Harassment and the Construction of Indian
Feminism, 18 LAW & POL'Y 419, 437 n.2 (1996) (acknowledging that Catharine MacKin-
non wrote groundbreaking and most eminent work on subject of sexual harassment).
129. MACKINNON, supra note 115.
130. Professor MacKinnon, who is a lawyer, teacher, and activist, is a leading ex-
pert on sex equality. See http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/mackinnon (describing
Professor MacKinnon's education and career); see also http://cgi2.www.law.umich.edu/
_FacultyBioPage/facultybiopage.asp?uniqname=kittytoo (describing Professor MacKin-
non's career and detailing her publications).
131. See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 208-13 (claiming that sexual harassment is
workplace discrimination because it impacts fundamental employment decisions, such
as hiring and promotions, as well as overall environment of workplace).
132. See MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 100, at 113 (stating that
sexuality is linchpin of sexual inequality); see also Case, supra note 122, at 57 (arguing
that in workplaces, entities considered feminine are systematically devalued); Katherine
M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1998) (recognizing that sexual harassment inscribes and enforces
patriarchal gender norms and male power); Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, supra note 19, at
232 (recognizing that exercise of private power is apparent in workplace discrimina-
tion); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1705 n.101 (quoting Professor MacKinnon).
133. See MAcKINNON, supra note 115, at 220 (claiming that society has defined situ-
ations of women's subordination, sexual and otherwise, as accepted societal norm); see
also Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Con-
struction of Gender and Race, 4J. GENDER RACE & JUsT. 183, 211 (2001) (asserting that
desire constitutes mechanism to subordinate women in workplaces).
134. See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 208-13 (explaining Professor MacKinnon's
idea that power dynamic between sexes in workplace is cause of sexual harassment).
Professor MacKinnon recommended that lawmakers draft specific sexual harass-
ment statutes, in addition to Title VII, to address this unequal power distribution
among men and women in America. Id. at 220. According to Professor MacKinnon,
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MacKinnon, sexual harassment stems from male-female power
differentials, especially male exploitation of their economic
power. 135 Professor MacKinnon noted men's ability to use sex-
ual advances and aggression to exploit their economic power
over their female workplace subordinates. 136 Forcing women to
tolerate and comply with sexual advances, or, in the alternative,
to endure economic and employment losses, strengthens the ex-
isting male-female power differentials, and further degrades wo-
men. 13 7 Thus, Professor MacKinnon asserted that men further
embed their established workplace power when they sexually
harass women.1 38
Responding to Professor MacKinnon's revolutionary work
and the burgeoning docket of sexual harassment cases in the
United States, other feminist legal theorists recognized the need
to critically analyze and reconceptualize the U.S. legal definition
of sexual harassment.13 9  For example, some scholars explain
that courts in the United States view sexual harassment through
the lens of male heterosexual desire, placing sexual desire at the
anti-discrimination law, including, but not limited to, Title VII, can potentially remedy
these socially-constructed, relational disparities found in the workplace, as well as in the
public sphere. Id. Professor MacKinnon asserted that instead of settling for Title VII's
currently vague, broad protection against sexual harassment, anti-discrimination law
should strive to address specifically the gender-based harassment that stems from the
male-female power differential, resulting in an inequitable workplace. See id. (recogniz-
ing that people in United States are accustomed to thinking of themselves as freely
choosing beings, rather than beings controlled by social imperatives).
135. See id. at 208-13, 217-18 (discussing male imposition of power in workplace
setting).
136. See id. at 208-13, 220 (acknowledging existence of gender power dynamics).
'137. See id. (noting that male-female power disparity is evident in workplace).
138. See id. (explaining how sexual harassment functions as sex discrimination).
According to Professor MacKinnon, sexual threats, suggestions, or coercions influence
both a woman's job definition and work atmosphere. See id. at 208. Sexual harassment
singles women out for undesired sexual attention that negatively impacts their work
product, regardless of their capacity to resist the harassment. Id. Thus, such treatment
becomes a condition of work that distinguishes women from their male co-workers. Id.
at 209.
139. See generally Schultz, supra note 116 (urging reformulation of sexual harass-
ment law theory to recognize centrality of male heterosexual desire to sexual harass-
ment law); cf Abrams, NewJurisprudence, supra note 112 (urging reformulation of sexual
harassment law theory around theories of women's subordination); Case, supra note
122 (urging reformulation of sexual harassment law theory to recognize difference be-
tween gender and sex); Franke, supra note 132, at 1245 (urging reformulation of sexual
harassment law theory, including comparison between workplace sex harassment and
sex harassment in other contexts, because no one-size-fits-all sexual harassment theory
exists).
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core of sexual harassment case analysis.14 ° In a paradigmatic ex-
ample, a heterosexual male supervisor makes sexual advances on
his female subordinate, and thus gender-based harassment be-
comes coextensive with sexual advances.141 Consequently, this
male-desire model of sexual harassment evident in case law links
male heterosexual desire to the male positions of power and au-
thority, and therefore overshadows the real source of sexual har-
assment: the male-female power disparity and attempts to pre-
serve that power differential. 14 2
Similarly, commentators argue that news reports covering
the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy emphasized, and
even overplayed, the sexual aspects of the controversy, thereby
illustrating popular U.S. culture's extremely narrow focus on the
sexual advances and desire aspects of sexual harassment cases. 143
140. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1686-87 (recognizing paradigm popularly used
to examine sexual harassment cases); William D. Evans, Jr., Tonight the Heartache's on Me:
Employer Liability for Workplace Sexual Harassment, 35 MD. B.J. 11, 14-15 (2002) (recogniz-
ing that recent scholarship in sexual harassment law calls attention to this paradigm);
Tamanna Qureshi & Anthony Vaupel, Should Sexual Orientation Be Covered by Title VII or
Prohibited?, 27 OHio N.U. L. REv. 679, 684 (2001) (describing Schultz's desire-domi-
nance paradigm); Rhonda Reaves, "There's No Crying in Baseball": Sports and the Legal and
Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUsT. 283, 302 (2001) (stating that
sexual harassment law operates on assumption of sexual desire). But see Gregory v.
Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 694-95 (2d Cir. 2001) (questioning whether, in particular case,
pleading that expresses dominant paradigm sufficiently supports finding that alleged
harasser conducted himself in certain manner because of plaintiff's sex).
141. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1704 (explaining how quid pro quo cases
helped entrench paradigm of sexual harassment cases); see also Kiren Dosanjh, Calling
on Oncale: Federal Courts' Post-Oncale Approach to the "Evidence Routes" to Discriminatory
Intent in Title VII Same-Sex Harassment Claims, 33 URB. L. 547, 547 (2001) (recognizing
sexual desire motivates heterosexual harassers in traditional sexual harassment para-
digms); Ann Juliano & StewartJ. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 548, 580 (2001) (describing sexual desire-dominance paradigm, and as-
serting that courts more easily find hostile work environment when sexual desire is
present).
142. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1688 (stating that prevailing sexual harassment
paradigm defines unwanted heterosexual sexual advances as focal point of sex-based
harassment); Qureshi & Vaupel, supra note 140, at 684 (explaining that preservation of
male-dominated status quo motivates desire-centered sexual harassment).
143. See CI-4A1.I s, supra note 78, at 246-47 (asserting that, because of gender
stereotypes, Hill's predicament resembled predicament of rape victim); Kimberle Cren-
shaw, Gender, Race, and the Politics of the Supreme Court: The Import of Anita Hill/Clarence
Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467, 1469-71 (1992) (understanding large role
Hill's sexuality played in hearings, especially because of stereotypes about black wo-
men's sexuality); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1692-94 (discussing Hill-Thomas contro-
versy); Anita Hill, Sexual Harassment is Losing its Meaning, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 22, 1998,
at H5 (recognizing that popular culture deems all workplace sexual transgression sex-
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At Thomas's judicial confirmation hearings, Hill testified that
she felt Thomas's sexual advances reflected a need for power
and domination.144 The widespread media coverage of the
event, however, focused on Thomas's sexual pursuit of Hill, ig-
noring the larger gender inequalities and non-sexual societal
power disparities between Thomas and Hill.'45 Thus, the media
disregarded sex-based power disparities, a primary source of sex-
ual harassment. 14 6
Finally, theorists observe that the lower courts in the United
States sometimes refuse to find non-sexual conduct in violation
of Title VII.' 4 7 These theorists argue that such refusal is likely
ual harassment, and therefore does not understand problem of, and protections availa-
ble against, sexual harassment); see also Christo Lassiter, Put the Lens Cap Back on the
Cameras in the Courtroom: A Fair Trial is at Stake, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6 (Jan. 1995) (recogniz-
ing media's distorting influence on hearings, such as Hill-Thomas hearing); cf. Michael
Comiskey, Not Guilty: The News Media in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 15 J.L. &
POL. 1, 6 (1999) (stating that Hill-Thomas hearings riveted television viewers, who ig-
nored other issues in Thomas' nomination).
Examination of newspapers from other countries demonstrates that the U.S. media
is not alone in defining sexual harassment primarily in terms of male heterosexual de-
sire. See, e.g., Manktelow, supra note I (describing incidents of sexual acts or statements
resulting in firing of employees in Australia); Commander Suspended, supra note 2
(describing sexual assaults on female Korean member of armed services); Oliver, supra
note 3 (describing sexually explicit language students used to deface teachers' class-
rooms).
144. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1693 (quoting Hill's testimony at Thomas's
confirmation hearings).
145. See id. at 1692 (stating that most publicized harassment cases demonstrate
sexual-desire and male-dominance view of sexual harassment); Helen Dewar, Democrats
Criticized For Strategy on Thomas; Approach in Hearings Called too Cautious, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 1991, at All (deeming Hill-Thomas hearings most sexually explicit Senate
hearings); Steve Pond, And Now, Here Comes judge', WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, at B9
(reporting that film mirroring events of Hill-Thomas hearings will focus on sexual
charges, and not necessarily sexual harassment); Bush Criticizes TV Trials, Condom Give-
aways, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991, at A19 (explaining that President Bush complained
that television viewers who watch television hearings are exposed to indecent material,
such as discussions at Hill-Clarence hearings).
146. See Schultz, supra note 116, at 1695-96 (asserting that media sensationalizes
sexual harassment as sexually centered); see also Charles B. Adams, The Impact of Race on
Sexual Harassment: The Disturbing Confirmation of Thomas/Hill, 2 HOwARD SCROLL 1, 11-
12 (1993) (recognizing that media and Senators focused on Hill and stereotypes about
sexual conduct of harassed, rather than harasser's actions).
147. SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 141, at 555 (arguing that courts fail to ac-
knowledge sexual harassment based on nonsexual behavior); Anne Lawton, Tipping the
Scales ofJustice in Sexual Harassment Law, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 517, 537 (2001) (criticiz-
ing Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000), for disaggregating
sexual and nonsexual conduct in hostile work environment case); Pope, supra note 119,
at 292 (calling this practice "conceptual gerrymandering"); Schultz, supra note 116, at
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due to the U.S. Supreme Court's and popular culture's inter-
twining of sex-based harassment and sexual desire.' 48 Conse-
quently, these commentators assert that some courts fail to in-
clude non-sexual acts of harassment or sex-based discrimination
in their hostile work environment analyses. 149 Thus, commenta-
1716-19 (describing courts' disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual conduct in sexual
harassment cases).
148. SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 141, at 581 (asserting that courts do not view
nonsexual harassment within scope of sexual harassment); Schultz, supra note 116, at
1708-09; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. Rsv. 458, 470-71 (2001) (asserting that sex-based discrimination must be
examined notjust in terms of one sexist act, but in greater context of workplace culture
and structures that may not be overtly sexual); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game:
Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 136 (2002) (recognizing
that courts disaggregate superficially different workplace behaviors, rather than consid-
ering overall environment hostility); see, e.g., King v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc.
Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 538-41 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining hostile work environment har-
assment claim on sexual conduct only, and analyzing nonsexual hostile conduct under
separate discriminatory treatment claim). But see O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235
F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that courts should not disaggregate sexual and
nonsexual conduct alleged in hostile work environment claims); Gregory v. Daly, 243
F.3d 687, 694 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring only that allegation permit inference that plain-
tiff suffered hostile work environment because of her sex); Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187
F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that conduct underlying sexual harassment does
not need to be overtly sexual in nature).
149. SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 141,. at 549 (basing this conclusion on find-
ings that plaintiffs alleging individual conduct are more successful than plaintiffs alleg-
ing group conduct, and that plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment based on sexual com-
ments or behavior are more successful than plaintiffs basing their claims on nonsexual,
although sexist, behavior); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1709 (explaining that in some
cases involving nonsexual actions, some courts may refuse to consider case under hos-
tile work environment framework); see, e.g., Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201
F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000) (disaggregating overfly sexual conduct and nonsexual retalia-
tory conduct in deciding sexual harassment case); King, 898 F.2d at 538-41 (distinguish-
ing supervisor's sexual conduct from his nonsexual misconduct in determining whether
hostile work environment existed).
One commentator feels that court disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual work-
place conduct further sexualizes the hostile work environment. Schultz, supra note 116,
at 1709. The courts' distinctions exclude pervasive forms of workplace gender antago-
nism that are sex-based, yet may be nonsexual. Id. at 1709-10. Such gender-based, yet
nonsexual, hostility is manifest in the nonsexual indignities that the plaintiff suffered in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), and the courts' subsequent interpreta-
tion of sexual harassment law in relation to those indignities. Id. Ms. Harris did not
enjoy the same work conditions as did her male counterparts. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991), affjd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1992), rev'd per curiam, 510 U.S. 17 (1993). For example, Ms. Harris's boss, Mr. Hardy
paid Harris on a different basis than his male managers, denied Harris company perks,
and forced Harris to bring coffee to meetings. Id. at *1-2. The lower courts deciding
the Harris case found this ludicrous behavior insufficient to meet Title VII require-
ments, as opposed to strictly sexual advances. Id. at *9; see also Schultz, supra note 116,
2002] THE SPECTRUM OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ADVOCACY 1239
tors argue thatjudicial decisions in the United States perpetuate
the view of sexual harassment as purely sexual, and disregard the
deeply embedded gender roles and power disparities that cause,
and continue to fuel, the problem of workplace sexual harass-
ment.1
5 0
2. Early stages
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment." 1 Specifically, a practice that injures a stat-
utorily designated group in the workplace constitutes illegal dis-
crimination.152 Sex is a protected classification under Title
VII. 153
The U.S. courts failed to recognize that sexual harassment
constituted a form of sex discrimination, however, until a district
court decided a quid pro quo15 case, Williams v. Saxbe,1 55 in
at 1711-12. Such an approach ignores the undermining effect that Hardy's treatment
had on Harris's status as a manager, as well as the fact that Harris received this treat-
ment because of her sex. See id. at 1711. The Harris case provided a clear opportunity
to transcend the Court's unduly restrictive focus of the lower court's decision, yet none
of the courts in front of which Harris appeared perceived the previous courts' or coun-
sels' narrow obsession with the lack of direct sexual advances on Harris as problematic.
Id. at 1712-13.
150. See Arriola, supra note 112, at 61 (hypothesizing that desire to preserve con-
struction industry as male power bastion motivates male construction workers' sexual
harassing actions); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1716-19 (criticizing courts' disregard for
sexual harassment in form of nonsexual conduct); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of
"Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88
GEO. L.J. 475, 510-12 (2000) (explaining phenomenon of disaggregation and arguing
that disaggregation severely limits use of hostile work environment doctrine).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
152. See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 208 (identifying "sexual harassment" as sex
discrimination, and recognizing that practices that differentially damage statutorily des-
ignated group both in work and at work constitute employment discrimination); Pope,
supra note 119, at 257-58 (quoting Professor MacKinnon's definition of sexual harass-
ment); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1718 (citing Professor MacKinnon's definition of
term "sexual harassment"); David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FoRDHtmn L. REv. 1265, 1270 (2001)
(quoting Professor MacKinnon's definition of sexual harassment and stating that Pro-
fessor MacKinnon coined term).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
154. See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 32 (coining term "quid pro quo"). A com-
plainant has a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a supervisor, usually a male,
uses his position to persuade a subordinate employee, usually a female, to perform
1240 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1205
1976.156 The court in Saxbe held that Title VII applies to all
forms of sex-based discrimination, regardless of whether the dis-
crimination manifests itself as sexual advances or sex-based ani-
mus."' Therefore, sex-based discrimination that links job bene-
fits to sexual favors parallels the imposition of any other non-
sexual acts requested because of one's gender, such as a male
boss's forcing a female subordinate to do his laundry, in addi-
tion to her other duties, in order to receive a raise.15
3. Recognition of Hostile Work Environment
In Meritor v. Vinson,'59 an influential case in the develop-
ment of sexual harassment law, the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII and concluded that, in addition to quid pro quo harass-
ment, the creation of a hostile work environment could be ille-
gal. 160 The respondent in Meritor, a bank teller at Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, endured four years of lewd suggestions, sexual ad-
vances, and even rape. 16' Although the respondent's work
environment was fraught with anxiety and pain, her harasser and
her company did not take any tangible adverse employment ac-
sexual favors. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 7 (1992). Quid pro quo sexual harassment, which conditions a fe-
male employee's receipt ofjob benefits on her performance of the sexual activities that
her male supervisor requests, is considered sex discrimination because the supervisor's
requests are based on the sex of the person to whom they are directed. See MACKINNON,
supra note 115, at 32-40 (describing quid pro quo cases).
155. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
156. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 154, at 7 (discussing Saxbe case).
A women's group in Ithaca, New York, called Working Women United, identified
the term "sexual harassment" during a speak out on the issue, which they held in 1975.
Schultz, supra note 116, at 1698-99; see FARLEY, supra note 113, at 74 (describing Ithaca
Speak-Out on Sexual Harassment and some participants).
Further, until 1986, only blatant quid pro quo sex discrimination was recognized as
constituting sexual harassment. See Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that
creating hostile work environment constituted sexual harassment).
157. See Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 657 (recognizing that Tide VII must be broadly
construed to provide protection beyond discrimination based on sex stereotypes).
158. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 154, at 10 (presenting analogy that illus-
trates how quid pro quo cases easily fit within traditional notions of intentional dispa-
rate treatment: in addition to normal job duties, only female clerks would be required
to take boss's children to school and pick up his laundry).
159. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
160. See id. at 73.
161. See id. at 60 (detailing behavior to which respondent was subjected, including
invitations to dinner, requests for sexual relations, fondling in public, and being fol-
lowed into ladies' room).
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tions against her, such as a demotion or a layoff.16 2
The Meritor Court found a Title VII violation, holding that
Title VII protections extend beyond economic or other tangible
discrimination to the creation of a "hostile work environ-
ment." '163 The Court stated that Title VII's language stretches
beyond mere monetary or professional injuries, and applies to
the "entire spectrum" of disparate workplace treatment.1 64
Thus, sexual harassment includes conduct that has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with a worker's environ-
ment or job performance. 165 In so concluding, the Court de-
clared that employees who are members of a statutorily pro-
tected group have the right to work without suffering intimida-
tion and abuse. 166
While Meritor first recognized hostile work environment
claims, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.'67 advanced understanding
of the concept. Theresa Harris served as one of two female man-
agers at a company that sold forklift equipment. 6 8 During her
tenure at Forklift, she was subject to work conditions much less
favorable than those of her male counterparts. 169 For example,
Harris's boss, Hardy, made disparaging comments about Harris
and her work abilities, but did not make the same comments
about male employees.' Further, Hardy paid Harris on a dif-
ferent basis than his male managers, denied Harris company
162. See id. at 64 (describing petitioner's argument that Title VII protections apply
only in cases where plaintiff asserts tangible or economic losses).
163. See id. at 64-65 (rejecting petitioners' argument that Title VII protections ap-
ply only to cases where plaintiff can show tangible discrimination based on congres-
sional intent and guidelines Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("E.E.O.C.")
authored).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985), E.E.O.C. guidelines stating
that any conduct that has purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with individ-
ual's work performance or creating hostile work environment is sexual harassment,
whether or not it is linked to direct economic grant or denial).
166. See id. at 65 (basing idea that employees have right to work in environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult on judicial decisions and
E.E.O.C. precedent).
167. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
168. See id. at 19.
169. See id. (describing Hardy's demeaning insults, suggestive behavior, and state-
ments to Harris).
170. See id. (quoting Hardy's offensive statements, such as "You're a woman, what
do you know," and "Dumb ass woman," and Hardy's suggestions that female employees
retrieve coins from his front pants pockets).
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perks, and forced Harris to bring coffee to meetings.17 ' The
lower courts deciding the case found this behavior insufficient to
constitute a hostile work environment claim because Hardy's
conduct, although insulting, was not severe enough to create an
abusive environment.1 72 In other words, the courts did not be-
lieve that Harris was so offended that she suffered harm to her
psychological well-being or work performance.1
7 3
The Harris Court reversed the lower courts' decision.
174
The Court stated that in a hostile environment, the harassed em-
ployee continuously endures unwelcome conduct, 7 5 severe and
pervasive enough to permeate the workplace and change the
conditions of her employment. 176 To determine the existence of
a hostile environment, courts must examine the complete work-
place circumstances, including frequency and severity of con-
duct, physical threat or humiliation, and unreasonable interfer-
ence with work.' 77 According to the Harris Court, the investiga-
tion of these elements requires consideration of both the
harassed employee's own subjective perception, and whether a
reasonable person would perceive the harassment sufficiently se-
vere and pervasive to create an abusive working environment. 178
171. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444, at *1-2 (M.D.
Tenn., Feb. 4, 1991), affd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd per curiam, 510 U.S. 17
(1993).
172. See id. at *6-7 (finding that Hardy's behavior was offensive, to both Harris and
reasonable woman, but did not rise to level of interfering with one's work perform-
ance).
173. See id. at *7 (finding that Hardy's comments were not so severe that they
would seriously affect Harris' psychological well-being).
174. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (describing standard adopted as "middle path"
between mere offense and severe psychological harm).
175. See Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (explaining that voluntary con-
duct can be unwelcome, and that correct inquiry is whether harassed person's conduct
indicated that sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether actual participation in
sexual intercourse was voluntary).
176. Id. at 67.
177. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (listing considerations for determining existence of
hostile environment, but recognizing importance of examining totality of circum-
stances, rather than just one factor); see also Meitor, 477 U.S. at 68 (stating that "totality
of circumstances" must be examined, including nature of sexual advances and context
in which incidents took place; therefore, sexually provocative dress or speech is not
irrelevant).
178. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23 (stating that Title VII's prohibition is not limited
to conduct that would affect reasonable person's psychological well-being).
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4. Employer Liability
Although the Supreme Court had decided several momen-
tous sexual harassment cases, few guidelines existed concerning
employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a
subordinate employee until 1998, when the Court decided
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 7 9 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth. 8 ° Until then, Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("E.E.O.C.") guidelines on employer liability for sexual har-
assment, first promulgated in 1980, served as one of the only
sources of guidance on the subject. 81 According to the E.E.O.C.
guidelines, the employer was responsible for sexual harassment
in the workplace if the employer knew or should have known of
an employee's harassing behavior, unless the employer took im-
mediate remedial action.18 2
In ruling that employers can be held liable for supervisors'
conduct, the Faragher Court recognized that employers occupy
the best position from which to prevent all forms of sexual har-
assment, a clear goal of Title VII a18 Furthermore, the Court
179. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In Faragher, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the lower
courts' decisions about employer liability for sexual harassment, and demonstrated that
the U.S. Supreme Court's only previous discussion of employer liability was found in
Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785.
180. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
181. E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, § 1604.11 (1980).
182. Id. § 1604.11 (d) ("With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an em-
ployer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer
(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate correct action.").
183. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (stating that employer has greater opportunity to
guard against supervisor misconduct than against' common worker misconduct, and
that employers have greater opportunity and incentive to screen, train, and monitor
supervisor performance); see also LINDEMANN SuPP., supra note 119, at 477 (identifying
two reasons why Court set forth employer liability standard: (1) employers are responsi-
ble for their supervisors' acts, and (2) employers should be encouraged to fight sexual
harassment in their workplaces).
While the Court advocates employer responsibility for maintaining a discrimina-
tion-free work environment, the Court did not carry this position as far as those scholars
who promote employer accountability would prefer. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note
115, at 94 (arguing that since sexual harassment is employment discrimination, there
should be little doubt that employer is accountable to some degree); Schultz, supra
note 116, at 1729 (recognizing judicial promise for social change). Conversely, Profes-
sor MacKinnon would extend the employer's duty to include challenging workplace
practices that hurt women. See MAcGKINNON, supra note 115, at 211-13 (criticizing lack
of greater employer liability). Responsibility for sexual harassment exists, according to
Professor MacKinnon, because the employer has an affirmative responsibility to elimi-
nate discrimination, which may in fact stem from gender-based antagonism. Id.
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stated that under an agency theory, an employer can be found
responsible when a supervisor harasses a subordinate, and relies
on his apparent authority to do so.184 As a result, the Court in
both Faragher and Burlington held that an employer can also be
held vicariously liable for a supervisor-created hostile work envi-
ronment.
185
The Court, however, recognized an affirmative defense,
thereby limiting employer liability.1 86 Specifically, the Faragher
Court stated that if an employer can prove that an employee did
not take advantage of the safeguards the employer created to
avoid preventable harms, then the employer can escape liabil-
ity. 18 7 For example, if an employee does not report sexual har-
assment when a mechanism for making such reports exist, then
she cannot assert a successful harassment claim. 188 This defense
gives employers credit for taking the preventative efforts that
policymakers and politicians envisioned when creating work-
place anti-discrimination law, 8 9 and provides incentives for em-
ployers to implement and enforce strong anti-sexual harassment
policies.' 90
184. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801 (recognizing supervisors' special authority that
enhances their ability to harass, and employers' ability to guard against such harass-
ment).
The Faragher and Burlington decisions demonstrate that many traditional tort argu-
ments fail to support vicarious liability claims, even though the concept is otherwise
widely accepted outside the context of sexual harassment law. See Faragher, 510 U.S. at
798-802; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 756-57. The Court rejected the claim that a supervisor's
sexual harassment of a subordinate constitutes conduct inside the scope of one's em-
ployment. SeeFaragher, 510 U.S. at 799; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 757. This finding extends
to courts' traditional refusal to impose vicarious liability for intentional torts, deeming
them beyond the scope of employment, because a master would have no means of
controlling a servant's deliberate actions. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 756. Similarly, the
Court stated that an employer facing the issue of sexual harassment in her workplace
may escape liability because she had no control over a supervisor demonstrating "gen-
der-based animus" or a longing to satisfy sexual urges. Id.
185. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
186. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (stating that limitation on sexual harassment re-
quires liability to be squared with Meritor holding that employer is not "automatically"
liable for supervisor-created harassment).
187. See id. at 805 (providing employer with affirmative defense in supervisor sex-
ual harassment case where subordinate employee failed to take advantage of employer-
provided safeguards).
188. See id. (explaining that employee must act with reasonable care to utilize em-
ployer's safeguards and prevent further harm).
189. See LINDEMANN SuPP., supra note 119, at 478.
190. Id. at 498.
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B. Sexual Harassment Law in India
Like women in the United States, women in India experi-
ence objectionable workplace conditions, often resulting from
the power differential between men and women. 191 Sexual har-
assment of Indian women is attributable to factors that are par-
ticular to Indian culture as well. 192 The Indian Supreme Court,
recognizing the nation-specific and universal influences that
shape workplace sexual harassment of Indian women, created
guidelines to address the problem that Indian law-makers had
long ignored. 93
1. Origins
Gender bias is evident in the Indian workplace, just as in the
workplace in the United States.19 4 In fact, sexual harassment ex-
ists throughout India.' The magnitude of the Indian sexual
191. See Franke, supra note 132, at 1249 (recognizing sexual harassment as tool to
enforce patriarchal power); Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1942 (basing 1992
investigation of sexual harassment in India on Western feminist theory that men's ag-
gression against women reflects male expression of power over, and contempt for, wo-
men, and not their sexual urges); Schultz, supra note 116, at 1705 n.101 (quoting Pro-
fessor MacKinnon's views on gender and power); see also Case, supra note 122, at 57
(noting systemic devaluation in workplace of things considered feminine and related to
women).
192. See generally Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25 (conducting study about work-
place sexual harassment in India); Sunder, supra note 128 (detailing development of
Indian feminist movement's fight to develop sexual harassment prohibitions).
193. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (creating guidelines to fight workplace sexual harass-
ment and fill legislative void).
194. See NussBAuM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 24-30 (discussing difference be-
tween guaranteed formal sex equality and Indian women's reality); SEGRAvE, supra note
105, at 160-61 (detailing great number of professional Indian women who reported
suffering sexual harassment at work); Afra Afsharipour, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of
Women's NGOs in the Enforcement of the Women's Convention, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 129, 132-33
(1999) (describing invidious violations of Indian women's rights); Kim, supra note 11,
at 72-73 (explaining that laws designed to protect women in India, such as those prohib-
iting dowry deaths, are laxly enforced); Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (as-
serting that gender bias is evidenced in many areas of Indian life, and recounting In-
dian Supreme Court rape decisions evidencing this bias); Besant Nager, The Status of
Girls and Women in India, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL NETWORK NEWS, Spring 1991, at I
(identifying India's discriminatory perceptions and treatment of female children).
195. See Apparel Export Promotion Council v. AK. Chopra, 1999 S.C. 759 (India),
available at http://www.lawinc.com [hereinafter Chopra] (describing workplace sexual
harassment of women as growing social menace); Premjit Singh, The Global Employer:
Global Labour, Employment, and Employee Benefits Bulletin, Supreme Court Decision Expands
Definition of Sexual Harassment, at http://www.bakerinfo.com/Publications/Docu
ments/1074/india.htm (recognizing increasing sensitivity toward sexual harassment
that Supreme Court's decision in Chopra demonstrates); Vishaka, supra note 4 (asserting
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harassment problem 96 is attributable to several factors.19 7 Some
of these factors are universal, and some are exclusively Indian. 198
First, although gender roles may differ in India and the
United States, commentators note that the treatment of women
who dare to deviate from their assigned roles is correspondingly
derogatory.199 Those women who fail to meet their countries'
respective standards of the ideal and proper woman are more
susceptible to harassment. 200 The case of Bhanwari Devi, a social
that there is urgent need for safeguards against workplace sexual harassment); Laxmi
Murthy, Sexual Harassment: Who Will Slay the Dragon?, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU), Sept.
15, 1997 (stating that most employed women have experienced some amount of sexual
harassment during their working lives).
Sexual harassment differs between the urban centers and the rural areas in India.
See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (recognizing that while feminism has
reached urban India, it has had little impact on rural Indian population). Also, in one
study, researchers stress that the sample body they used for their study was comprised of
Indian college students, who were much more progressive than many Indians in rural
areas. Id. at 1950 (describing their research participants as "elite").
196. See Bhandare, supra note 5 (quoting survey in which sixty percent of working
women and fifty-five percent of female students said they have faced sexual harassment;
adding that non-verbal overt sexual conduct was reported in fifty-four percent of those
cases and uninvited sexual remarks were reported in thirty-nine percent); see also Singh,
supra note 195 (stating that sexual harassment is extremely prevalent based on survey of
working women, in which forty-seven percent said that they had been sexually harassed
at work).
197. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 420 (questioning how sexual harassment in
India is uniquely experienced and explained); see also Nussbaum, Women and Work,
supra note 32 (discussing different reasons for gender inequality in India). See generally
Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 35 (explaining factors in Indian
legal system that contribute to gender inequality).
198. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 436 (concluding that Indian feminist mobiliza-
tion around sexual harassment may seem in some ways non-culturally specific, but also
embodies struggle for authentic Indian identity, differentiated from Western femi-
nism); see also Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (comparing lives of two Indian
women who come from different castes and have different levels of financial support,
and stating that these women's problems are recognizable globally).
199. See NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 25 (describing Indian Penal
Code's view of women as "Victorian"); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Mani-
festo (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1050 (1992) (asserting that more
sexually available woman appears, less likely she will be to receive legal protection
against offenses involving sexual conduct); Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1948-49
(recognizing that divorced Indian women are much more likely to suffer harassment
than unmarried and married women, and that men have less sympathy than women for
female victims of male sexual harassment); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra
note 58, at 49 (recognizing that Indian courts consider traditional ideals about women
as fragile and motherly in deciding sex discrimination cases).
200. See NuSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 44 n.21 (noting that women in
India can only achieve certain feminist goals, such as anti-sexual harassment protec-
tions, using.Victorian notions of female modesty because legal protections are legacies
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worker in a Rajasthani village, serves as a salient example.2 1 A
forty-year old social activist, Devi was a non-traditional Indian wo-
man: she was bold; politically active; and therefore, incredibly
offensive to many. 20 2 Devi endured months of sexual harass-
ment at the hands of some men who lived in the village because
of her political work campaigning against child marriages. 20 3
The harassment grew increasingly severe, culminating in a brutal
gang rape.2 °4
While workplace harassment of Indian women includes ex-
periences that women in the United States and many other na-
tions and cultures share, scholars comment that sexual harass-
ment in the Indian workplace is also the result of uniquely In-
dian cultural beliefs and practices. 205 Although formally Indian
of Victorian British law-making); Sunder, supra note 128, at 429 (emphasizing that most
Indian women she interviewed experienced sexual harassment most when they con-
sciously or unconsciously challenged preexisting ideas of proper behavior or identity
for Indian women); see also Rasheeda Bhagat, India: Village Health Nurses Allege Harass-
ment, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU), Dec. 8, 1997 (quoting Indian woman, who felt espe-
cially targeted for harassment because she was not yet married); Murthy, supra note 195
(explaining that public disapproves less of sexual harassment of women in professions
considered more "dubious" and "loose," such as jobs in entertainment or airline indus-
try, than they do of sexual harassment of women at university).
201. See NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 31 (describing beginning of
Devi's case); Sunder, supra note 128, at 424 (describing rape of Bhanwari Devi, social
worker employed by State-sponsored women's development program); see also
Rasheeda Bhagat, Checking Sexual Harassment: A Long Overdue Measure, BUSINESS LINE
(THE HINDU), Sept. 2, 1997, (identifying Devi's case as catalyst for petition seeking en-
forcement of working women's fundamental rights); Bhandare et al., supra note 5 (rec-
ognizing that brutal gang rape of Devi inspired unprecedented Supreme Court sexual
harassment decision); Sudhish Kamath, India: When a True Story Inspires a Film, THE
HINDU, Aug. 27, 2001, (recognizing importance of Devi's story, which was made into
film).
202. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 425 (quoting article in Hindustan Times);
Kamath, supra note 201 (describing Devi as lower caste, grass roots social worker who
spoke out about prevalent social ills and appeared powerful in person); Pinki Virani,
Long Wait for Justice, THE HINDU, Mar. 4, 2001 (describing Devi as women in her mid-
50s, living in same Rajasthan village as her rapists, and publicly asking her country to be
just).
203. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 424; see also NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 8, at 30 (describing Devi's rape as male weapon against woman crusading for polit-
ical change).
204. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 424; see also NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 8, at 30 (describing Devi's case and explaining that Devi's rapists were influential
men in their community, and therefore police delayed registration of her case).
205. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 420 (stating that term "sexual harassment"
originated in West, but is not limited to describing Western phenomenon); Nussbaum,
Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 40-48 (explaining plural systems of religious
personal law impacting Indian legal system and efforts at achieving gender equality);
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women are equal to men, scholars assert that the genesis of the
gender power disparity in India is in many ways distinctly In-
dian.2 ° 6 Scholars contend that Indian women are expected to
conform to an inequitable social role that Indian texts and tradi-
tions have influenced, and, in some cases, mandated.20 7
First, experts note that ancient and contemporary rules of
law governing Indian life conflict.208 Article 15 of the Indian
Constitution, which prohibits sex-based discrimination,20 9 stands
Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (introducing two Indian women who come
from different castes and have different levels of financial support to determine similar-
ities and differences of those women's situations; asserting that such evaluation is neces-
sary to develop "normative theory of social justice in today's interlocking world.").
206. See NussBAuM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 24 (describing situation of wo-
men in India as difficult, unique, and complex); Sunder, supra note 128, at 425 (detail-
ing distinct "analytic paradigm" Indian feminists can use to analyze sexual harassment
specifically in context of India, in which analysis centers on Indian national and cultural
women's gender roles); see also Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1950 (assuming
that survey findings, consistent with Western feminist power differential perspective,
would appear even greater had the researchers obtained their sample population from
more traditional, rural Indian population, rather than urban college students).
207. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 430 (stating that Hindus submit to dictates of
religious texts that prescribe women's social roles); see also Ritter, supra note 31, at 80-81
(explaining derivation of traditional Hindu view of human rights and that one must
fulfill her socially prescribed duties on earth to receive rights).
208. See Gita Gopal, Gender and Economic Inequality in India: The Legal Connection, 13
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 63, 67 (explaining that constitutional promise of equality is not
achieved, in part because personal laws govern each religious group in India); Menon
& Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (explaining that in rural India, where citizens are
tradition-bound and less educated, traditional texts prescribing women's subservience
to men are obeyed, even in face of global gender equality); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex
Equality, supra note 58, at 38-47 (explaining different sources of Indian law, including
Indian Constitution and various religious sources); Ritter, supra note 31, at 80 (arguing
that sacred Hindu texts do not articulate universal principles of fundamental human
rights).
209. INDIA CONST. Pt. III (Fundamental Rights), art. 15. Article 15 states:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of
birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to-
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public en-
tertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public re-
sort maintained whole or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the
use of general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for women and children.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State
from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially
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in opposition to other non-governmental texts that negate the
intended equalizing effect of the Article. 10 For example,
Manusmriti, an ancient code of laws the Indian sage, Manu, au-
thored, orders the absolute subservience of women to men. 1
Additionally, Brahmanical religious texts dictate that women em-
body the positive characteristics of a nation, acting in a benevo-
lent, religious, and self-sacrificing manner. 2  Scholars explain
that these historical texts, which have contributed in large part
to current nationalistic political discourse and to Indians' relig-
ious beliefs, wield strong influence in Indians' decisions regard-
ing way of life, formulations of proper moral ideology, and, thus,
treatment of women. 3
As scholars have noted, the image of women these texts pre-
sent emphasizes women's spiritual and traditional qualities, at-
tributes that stand in direct opposition to the popular concep-
tions of aggressive, sexually liberated Western women.214 Thus,
prevalent ideas about the comportment of the ideal Indian wo-
and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes.
Id.
210. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (citing writings of ancient In-
dian sage, Manu, and stating that worst examples of women's inequality are found in
"tradition bound" societies); see also Gopal, supra note 208, at 67 (stating that traditional
Hindu law reflects gender biases that contravene constitutional gender equality guaran-
tees).
211. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (explaining that unmitigated
subservience of women to men mandated in Manusmriti is evident in modem India,
especially in rural areas); see also Narasimhan, supra note 210, at 47 (explaining that
Code of Manu states that wife's duty to husband never ends, even if husband sells or
abandons her).
212. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 430 (detailing Indian women's identity in an-
cient Indian text); see also Ratna Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of
Culture, Sex and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333, 337 (2001) (describing
nationalistic behavioral norms women are expected to embody, such as chastity, submis-
sion, self-sacrifice, and patience); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at
49 (asserting that Indian Supreme Court equates being Indian woman with being
mother, and puts woman on pedestal because of her supposed fragility).
213. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 429-30 (describing nationalist discourse and
traditional texts that help shape women's social roles in India); see also Ritter, supra note
31, at 80-84 (explaining how Hindu texts dictate what constitutes proper behavior nec-
essary to acquire rights).
214. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 430 (contrasting ideal Indian woman with pop-
ular stereotypes of Western women, who are considered vulgar, sexually promiscuous,
and possessing little common sense); see also Kapur, supra note 212, at 356 (explaining
that Indian feminism has positioned itself as anti-Western to increase acceptance);
Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 49 (asserting that Indian Su-
preme Court views woman as sacred creature).
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man downplay Indian women's sexuality, at least in the public
sphere,215 and particularly in contrast to her counterparts in the
United States. 216
Second, scholars explain that cultural mores also influence,
and stifle, public interactions between Indian men and wo-
men.2 17  Scholars explain that traditional Indian norms pro-
scribe Indian women from freely dating or dancing with men.218
Social rules direct that Indian women are expected to communi-
cate with men in a reserved manner. 219  Further, Indian-pre-
215. See, e.g., MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 100 (arguing that pri-
vate and public spheres of women's lives are conflated because to know women's politi-
cal situation is to know women's, personal lives, including their sexual lives, as women
suffer in their personal lives under pervasive male power); see also Haddon, supra note
17, at 379-80 (explaining that private issues, such as domestic violence, are interna-
tional human rights issues); Higgins, Regarding Rights, supra note 19, at 232 (criticizing
international human rights framework for ignoring male private power); Kim, supra
note 11, at 66-69 (explaining that private sphere is often viewed as beyond State's reach
when issue involves cultural practices that harm women and describing debate in inter-
national human rights law about what role of State should be regarding private sphere).
Thus, it can be argued that Indian women's expression is suppressed in the private
sphere as well, because of the male-dominated power structure under which women
live. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 40 (explaining role
of religious personal law in India, and accompanying sex inequalities).
216. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 430 (explaining that Indian women whom au-
thor interviewed were conscious of pressure to conform to widely-accepted notions of
Indian women's identity to avoid workplace harassment, especially because those no-
tions about Indian women stand in direct contrast to ideas about Western women); see
also Kapur, supra note 212, at 342 (explaining that increasing pervasiveness of sexual
imagery in Indian culture and greater openness of different sexual orientations are
targeted as Western contaminants of Indian culture).
217. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1941 (citing traditional view of wo-
men's status and expected behavior in Indian society); Sunder, supra note 128, at 431
(explaining that working women expressed need to refrain from outgoing behavior at
work because of propriety and caution that outgoing behavior would send wrong sig-
nals to men); see also Martha Nussbaum, "Whether from Reason or Prejudice" Taking Money
forBodily Services, 27J. LEG. STUDIES 693, 699-700 (1998) [hereinafter Reason or Prejudice]
(explaining cultural anxiety existing around female body).
218. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1941 (attributing sexual harassment
in part to low status of women and lack of free interaction between men and women,
including dating and dancing); Nussbaum, Reason or Prejudice, supra note 217, at 699
(explaining that in some parts of India it is still considered inappropriate for women
from good families to dance in public); Radhika Parameswaran, Feminist Media Ethnogra-
phy in India: Exploring Power, Gender, and Culture in the Field, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY, Feb.
2001 (stating that as Indian woman, author experienced curtailment of her mobility
and freedom).
219. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 431 (describing sentiments of woman inter-
viewed, who explained that Indian women must not talk too freely or boldly with every-
body at work).
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scribed manner of dress emphasizes propriety.220 For example,
employers prefer that their female employees wear the tradi-
tional sari, as opposed to the salwar kameez, a long shirt and
loose pant.221 Cultural practices therefore dictate women's pub-
lic actions, and thus, according to scholars, strengthen the power
differential between women and men, to whom rules of public
conduct do not apply as strictly.222
Finally, scholars assert that factors such as caste, class, relig-
ion, and region combine and conflict with gender, and each
other, to influence the magnitude and type of discrimination In-
dian women face.22 3 Sexual harassment initially appeared in In-
dian discourse as a Western topic that was fashionable to discuss,
and sexual harassment was therefore perceived to affect only the
Indian elite. 224 This perception meant that upper- and middle-
class women found greater support for their complaints, while
lower-class women received less attention and encourage-
ment.225 Sexual harassment persists, however, in all strata of In-
220. See id. at 430-31 (asserting that emphasis on women's workplace dress
manifests conflation of gender and national identity in workplace); Parameswaran,
supra note 218 (including dressing immodestly on list of activities that could bring fam-
ily dishonor).
221. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 430-31 (explaining that traditional sari is
viewed as more Indian and proper, and that some women think that dressing in "im-
proper" fashion will provoke their male co-workers to misbehave).
222. See id. (recounting interviewee's statement that women must behave and
dress appropriately at work or men will be provoked to misbehave); Menon & Kanekar,
supra note 25, at 1941 (asserting that men can act as aggressive and predatory as de-
sired, while women are expected to be bashful and submissive objects of male prey);
Nager, supra note 194, at 1 (asserting that bias favoring male children is result of cul-
tural, religious, and economic factors); Parameswaran, supra note 218 (stating that au-
thor's brother's mobility and freedom were not curtailed in same manner that author's
movement and liberty was stifled).
223. See Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (examining lives of two Indian
women to determine root of deprivations they suffer, and concluding that both suffer
deprivations that arise not only as result of their sex, but also because of their respective
castes and their residence in particular Indian regions); see also Anita Krug, One by One,
7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 278, 278 (1994) (stating that deeply entrenched social attitudes
and religious tradition influence Indian women's status); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex
Equality, supra note 58, at 40-47, 49 (explaining that religion and caste influence gender
equality, and recognizing that Indian Court recognizes combination of progressive and
traditional elements in deciding gender issue cases).
224. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 427 (asserting that many Indian women viewed
sexual harassment as problem that only Indian elite faced, and therefore did not want
to discuss issue); see also Kapur, supra note 212, at 337 (explaining that Indian middle-
class nationalism was elaborated in one's home, and therefore traditional social forces
shaped sexual norms).
225. See Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1950 (acknowledging "elitist" nature
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dian society, affecting women across social and caste lines.
226
Thus, women throughout India need assistance in protecting
against, and preventing, such harassment, like women in the
United States, and elsewhere. 227
2. Early Stages
In her article, In a "Fragile Space": Sexual Harassment and the
Construction of Indian Feminism, Madhavi Sunder 228 explores how
sexual harassment came to be distinctly experienced and theo-
rized in India.229 Despite sexual harassment's persistence, coun-
try-wide sexual harassment legislation does not exist in India.23 °
of study that focused on urban college students); Sunder, supra note 128, at 427-28
(noting that early articles about problem of sexual harassment focused on upper- and
middle-class women); Rasheeda Bhagat, An Officer, Yes: A Gentleman, No, BUSINESS LINE,
Jan. 13, 1998 (recognizing that recent Indian Supreme Court sexual harassment deci-
sions, especially the Bajaj case, embolden middle-class women to take action against
workplace harassment).
226. See SEGRAVE, supra note 105, at 160-61 (describing sexual harassment of In-
dian women teachers, nurses, and State social workers); see Han, supra note 6, at 787
(including Indian women in discussion among women lawyers from different countries
who experienced workplace sexual harassment and other gender-based indignities);
Menon & Kanekar, supra note 25, at 1940 (acknowledging that sexual harassment has
existed throughout history, and affects all Indian women, regardless of whether femi-
nism has influenced them); Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (declaring that
woman's body that gets beaten is experienced similarly all over world).
227. See NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 25 (recognizing inadequacy and
gender-related stereotypes of protections against problem of sexual harassment in In-
dia); Sunder, supra note 128, at 437 (asserting necessity of legislation and legal atten-
tion to sexual harassment of Indian women); see also SEGRAVE, supra note 105, at 1 (stat-
ing commentator's sentiment that all women working outside home do so with expecta-
tion of sexual harassment). See generally Han, supra note 6 (discussing different
women's experiences with terrible workplace conditions throughout world, including
sexual harassment).
228. Madhavi Sunder is an Acting Professor of Law at the University of California,
Davis. She teaches property and intellectual property. Her research concentrates on
law and culture. E-mail from Madhavi Sunder to Louise Feld (Mar. 4, 2002, 4:55:00
PST) (on file with author).
229. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 420 (stating purpose of her paper).
230. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (noting lack of legislative measures to combat sexual
harassment in Indian workplace); see also Supreme Court Quasi-Law on Sexual Harassment,
BUSINESS STANDARD, Aug. 14, 1997, at 1 (stating that there is "legal vacuum"); Nuss-
baum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 57 (acknowledging that sexual harass-
ment legislation binding on non-governmental actors does not yet exist and current
political climate does not seem favorable for such legislation to pass).
While the unified Indian government has not yet passed anti-sexual harassment
legislation, several state governments have enacted such legislation. See After Four Years,
Bihar Heed Supreme Court Order on Sexual Harassment, THE STATESMAN, Aug. 19, 2001 (stat-
ing that state of Bihar took four years to implement Supreme Court's sexual harassment
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This void continues, in part, because, for many years, Indian
feminists did not consider anti-sexual harassment protections
relevant to Indian women's lives.2 3 1 In 1979, when the issue
briefly surfaced within Indian feminist circles, 232 many Indian
women involved in that country's feminist movement criticized it
as a "bourgeois" issue lacking importance.233 In a personal inter-
view, Madhu Kishwar, the editor of the Indian feminist maga-
zine, Manushi, explained that, compared to dowry deaths, custo-
dial rape, communal riots, child marriages, and overwhelming
poverty, sexual harassment seemed too trivial an issue to con-
cern Indian women.234 She further suggested that Indian wo-
men, in contrast to sexually immoral Western women, could tol-
erate sexual harassment because of the more extreme problems
with which Indians had to contend.235 Many lawmakers and citi-
zens of the Indian public shared this sentiment. 236 Facing the
decision in Vishaka); C. Antony Louis, Kerala Lags Behind, THE HINDU, July 19, 2001
(stating that nine states have not amended civil services rules to prohibit sexual harass-
ment, including supposedly progressive state of Kerala); see also Eveteasing to be Made
Non-Bailable Offence, THE HINDU, Sept. 11, 2001 (explaining that Chennai state govern-
ment made all sexual harassment offenses non-bailable).
231. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 422 (explaining why Indian feminists did not
rally around issue of sexual harassment).
232. See id. (describing cover story on sexual harassment detailed in Manushi, In-
dian feminist magazine).
233. See id. (quoting Indian feminist critics' disdainful categorization of sexual har-
assment as "bourgeois issue"); see also Bhagat, supra note 225 (recognizing that Su-
preme Court sexual harassment decisions empower primarily middle-class Indian wo-
men).
234. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 421 (asserting that sexual harassment was too
frivolous to be considered "Indian" issue).
235. See id. at 421-422 (comparing "predicament" of Indian and Western women);
Krug, supra note 223, at 278 (listing legal services provided to Indian women at legal
division of All India Democratic Women's Association, such as helping victims of dowry-
related crimes, child custody, and domestic violence). See generally Gopal, supra note
208 (discussing Indian women's economic dependence because of Indian property
laws); Subrata Paul, Combating Domestic Violence Through Positive International Action in the
International Community and in the United Kingdom, India, and Africa, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 227, 237-40 (1999) (describing domestic violence problems of Indian wo-
men).
236. See NuSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 30 (noting male disregard to-
wards Devi after her suffering of sexual harassment and rape); Menon & Kanekar, supra
note 25, at 1947 (noting male subjects in study concerning workplace sexual harass-
ment in India blamed victim for causing problem); Sunder, supra note 128, at 420
(describing derisive reaction that Indian lawmakers and Indian public have to Indian
feminists attempting to reform sexual harassment laws); Harassment at Work, THE
HINDU, Mar. 4, 2001 (recounting demeaning responses women received to their work-
place sexual harassment complaints); Of Lawyers and the Law, THE HINDU, July 9, 2000
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adverse conditions of Indian women's lives, combined with anti-
feminist Indian sentiment, Indian feminists needed to adopt a
new, non-Western method for framing the problem of sexual
harassment in a manner that would garner public support for
protections against behavior that some Indians do not consider
problematic.2 3 7
Indian feminists finally addressed the problem of sexual
harassment after a long battle to redefine rape law in the Indian
courts.23 " These feminists recognized that traditional rape law
focused on male penetration and patriarchal control of women,
and therefore did not adequately protect women. 239 Thus, In-
dian feminists posited a woman-centered attitude towards rape
law, lobbying for a legal analysis of rape that begins with the wo-
man's experience of violation.2 4 ° In 1992, in order to challenge
what they felt were false distinctions drawn between rape and
sexual harassment, after the gang rape of a social worker who
had been harassed for her work, Indian social activists and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs")2 41 placed the controver-
sial issue of sexual harassment at the forefront of the Indian wo-
men's movement.24 2 To distinguish their crusade against sexual
(describing negative response of fellow lawyers, male and female, to Sangeeta Sharma's
complaints of workplace sexual harassment, and Sharma's ultimate suicide, which is
attributed to sexual harassment she suffered).
237. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 421 (asserting that Indian women need to cre-
ate new identities, merging older nationalistic and cultural loyalties, and newer individ-
ual identities and ways of life); see also Kapur, supra note 212, at 342 (explaining that
Indians with sexual ideas and orientations radical for India are surfacing and trying to
include themselves in traditional Indian culture and nationalism).
238. See NUSSBAUM, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 30 (arguing that rape is used to
fight women's progress, and citing Devi case as example); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex
Equality, supra note 58, at 55-56 (explaining how Indian feminists equated Devi's brutal
gang rape with unsafe working conditions and sexual harassment at work); Sunder,
supra note 128, at 423 (crediting nearly ten-year long feminist campaign to reform rape
laws with successfully effecting significant changes in Indian rape law).
239. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 423 (explaining why traditional approach to
rape law disturbed many Indian feminists, who felt that this focus did not move rape
beyond realm of conventional patriarchal definition).
240. See id. (describing 1990 report from meeting of Forum Against the Oppres-
sion of Women).
241. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (stating that social activists and non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") filed class action to address "societal aberration" of sexual har-
assment).
242. See Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 55-56 (detailing wo-
men's group and NGOs' successful efforts to persuade Court of great dangers, includ-
ing rape, that sexual harassment holds for women at work); Sunder, supra note 128, at
424 (explaining that Indian feminists sought to challenge distinction between sexual
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harassment from those battles U.S. feminists fought, Indian fem-
inists attempted to expand their conception of sexual harass-
ment beyond the U.S. feminist focus on sex-based power differ-
entials, and the U.S. popular culture's obsession with sexual ad-
vances in sexual harassment cases.2 4 3 Instead, Indian feminists
identified the reasons that Indian women experience sexual har-
assment as not only attributable to their sex, but also particular
to their culture.244 With sexual harassment becoming a heated
public debate, the stage was set for the government to respond
to the pressures of the Indian women's movement.24 5 Indian
lawmakers, however, remained silent on this issue of increasing
importance.2 4 6
3. Recognition of Workplace Sexual Harassment
In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, the Indian Supreme Court
recognized that women in the workplace needed protection
from such harassment. 247 News of Bhanwari Devi's having suf-
fered sexual harassment so severe that it culminated in a brutal
harassment and rape in order to develop contemporary legal notions of women's viola-
tion, reaching beyond act of male penetration to include power dynamics between men
and women).
243. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 424 (recognizing difficult task of differentiating
Indian feminist fight against sexual harassment as distinctly Indian movement).
244. See generally Nussbaum, Women and Work, supra note 32 (discussing cultural
norms and roles that affect sexual harassment in India); Sunder, supra note 128 (dis-
cussing uniquely Indian experience and explanation of sexual harassment in India).
Sunder's assertion that this Indian feminist focus is a specifically Indian approach to a
women's issue is inaccurate in light of recent anti-essentialist feminist developments in
the United, States that stress the importance of examining a woman's contrasting and
intersecting identities. See, e.g., Abrams, Complex Female Subject, supra note 94, at 2479
(surveying recent U.S. judicial decisions to determine whether courts acknowledge, and
respect, complex nature of woman as subject); see also Crenshaw, supra note 113 (ex-
plaining how different oppressive forces shape black women's experience of discrimina-
tion); Harris, supra note 113 (criticizing liberal feminist theory as essentialist and ex-
plaining unique experiences of oppression among women of colors); Martha Minow,
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 47 (1988) (describing essen-
tialist nature of liberal feminist theory).
245. See Sunder, supra note 128, at 424 (describing sexual harassment as issue ripe
for legal reform after Devi's rape).
246. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (noting that legislative measures did not exist to
combat sexual harassment in Indian workplace); Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality,
supra note 58, at 57 (acknowledging that sexual harassment legislation binding on non-
governmental actors does not yet exist); Supreme Court Quasi-Law, supra note 230 (recog-
nizing legal vacuum).
247. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (stating that guidelines set forth in decision function
to fill absence of legislative measures and acknowledging urgent need to find effective
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gang rape spurred women's groups and NGOs to file a non-ad-
versarial claim with the Indian Supreme Court to enforce work-
ing women's rights in 1.992.248 In 1997, a three-judge bench of
the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, 24 9 ratified
guidelines that these women's groups had authored to both pre-
vent sexual harassment and protect working women in the ab-
sence of appropriate legislation. 25 °  Thus, the Indian Supreme
Court, relying on international and domestic sources of law, is-
sued a decision that prohibited workplace sexual harassment,
and provided instructions and a mechanism for harassed women
to report and resolve sexual harassment at work.251 The Court's
decision was an unusually proactive, affirmative measure.252
a. Sources of Law in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
The Indian Supreme Court relied upon domestic and inter-
national documents, intertwining the two sources of law to reach
its decision.253 The opinion began with a discussion of the rele-
vant Indian constitutional provisions.254 The Court condemned
sexual harassment because it violates the fundamental rights of
alternative mechanism to these guidelines); Rasheeda Bhagat, supra note 201 (asserting
that governmental action on major problem of sexual harassment was long overdue).
248. See Murthy, supra note 195 (listing Indian women's groups that drew up
guidelines and filed petition). The women's groups and NGOs used Article 32 of the
Indian Constitution to petition the Court. See Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality,
supra note 58, at 55 (explaining how citizens may directly appeal to Court to secure
rights). Article 32(1) provides that through petition, citizens may appeal directly to the
Supreme Court to secure enforcement of their rights. INDIA CONST. art. 32(1).
249. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (identifying Chief Justice Verma as opinion's au-
thor).
250. See Murthy, supra note 195 (emphasizing that Vishaka decision is especially
significant because of absence of civil and penal laws adequately protecting women
from sexual harassment).
251. See generally Vishaka, supra note 4.
252. See Supreme Court Quasi-Law, supra note 230 (stating that Court's decision was
rare affirmative action"); see also Murthy, supra note 195 (quoting Indian women's
rights activist and petitioner in Vishaka case, Urvashi Butalia, who rejoiced at extremely
broad definition of sexual harassment provided by decision).
253. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (relying upon international conventions, such as
Beijing Statement on the Independence of Judiciary in LAWASIA region ("Beijing
Statement") and CEDAW, in conjunction with domestic documents, such as Indian
Constitution, to decide case); see also Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58,
at 56 (recognizing that Vishaka decision demonstrates interaction between interna-
tional treaties and domestic courts).
254. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (stating that Court will refer to those constitutional
provisions, which envision judicial intervention for eradication of social evil of sexual
harassment).
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gender equality and the right to life and liberty that the Indian
Constitution guarantees. 5 Concentrating on Part III, the fun-
damental rights section of the Indian Constitution, the Court de-
tailed the Articles that sexual harassment violates: Article 14
mandates equal treatment and protections for all Indian citi-
zens; 256 Article 15 prohibits discrimination based on religion,
race, caste, sex, or place of birth;257 Article 19(1) (f) states that all
Indian citizens are permitted to practice any profession; 258 and
Article 21 protects life and personal liberty.2 59 Furthermore,
under Article 32 of Part III, the Court has the power to enact
guidelines providing remedies to. those women who have suf-
fered harassment.26 ° The Court therefore used its Article 32
powers to ratify the fundamental right of working women to gen-
der equality, which the Indian Constitution's provisions encom-
pass.2 6 '
After establishing the basic constitutional rights that sexual
harassment violates, the Court turned to international human
rights law.26 2 First, the. Court acknowledged Article 51 (C) 2 6 3 and
255. See id. (recognizing that gender equality means that woman has right to life
with dignity).
256. INDIA CONST. art. 14. Article 14 provides that "[t]he State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the terri-
tory of India." Id.
257. Id. art. 15.
258. Id. art. 19(1) (g). Article 19(1) states that "[a]ll citizens shall have the right
... (g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business." Id.
art. 19(1).
259. Id. art. 21. Article 21 states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." Id.
260. Id. art. 32. Article 32 provides:
Remedies for the enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the en-
forcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by
clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to
exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the power
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as oth-
erwise provided for by this Constitution.
Id.
261. Id..
262. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (stating that in absence of domestic anti-sexual har-
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Article 253264 of the Indian Constitution as permitting the State
to adopt any international treaty that promotes fundamental
rights. 265 To further promote the objectives of the constitutional
guarantees, the Court read applicable international conventions
into the Constitution.2 66 Thus, the Court asserted that interna-
tional conventions help guard against sexual harassment. 267
The Court also found support for its action under interna-
tional law, both from treaty-based and customary law.2 68 In its
analysis, the Court first cited principles from the 1995 Beijing
Statement of the Independence of theiJudiciary in the LAWASIA
region ("Beijing Statement") to establish the propriety of its ac-
tions.2 6 9 Specifically, the Court noted the importance of the
Beijing Statement's Article 10, which imposes duties on the judi-
ciary to promote human rights and ensure equal protection
assment law, Court will create effective measures to check evil of sexual harassment of
working women in all workplaces, and that international conventions and norms are
significant for purpose of interpreting guarantee of gender equality); but see Sunder,
supra note 128, at 421-22 (explaining that Indian feminists wanted to address women's
issues in India through measures unique to India, as opposed to international human
rights mechanisms).
263. INDIA CONST. pt. IVA, art. 51(c). Article 51 provides: "[p]romotion of inter-
national peace and security: The State shall endeavour to ... (c) foster respect for
international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one
another." Id.
264. INDIA CONST. pt. XI (Relations Between the Union and the States), ch. I (Leg-
islative Relations), art. 253. Article 253 states:
Legislation for giving effect to international agreements:
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parlia-
ment has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of
India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other
country or countries or any decision made at any international conference,
association, or other body.
Id.
265. Vishaka, supra note 4 (claiming ability to observe international treaties that
promote fundamental rights).
266. See id. (reading international conventions consistent with Indian Constitution
fundamental rights section into that section to "enlarge" meaning of constitutional
mandates contained therein).
267. See id. (acknowledging that gender equality includes, at minimum, protection
from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity).
268. See id. (using treaty-based and customary law to decide case).
269. Beijing Statement, Aug. 19, 1995, available at http://www.law.murdoch.
edu.au/icjwa/beigst.htm. The Beijing Statement contains the standards that chiefjus-
tices throughout Asia agreed represent the minimum necessary for the independent
and effective functioning of the judiciary. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (explaining creation
and function of Beijing Statement).
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under the law.2 0 Thus, the Beijing Statement provided ajustifi-
cation for the Court's. issuance of guidelines in the human rights
field.271
Once the Court established that international agreements
supported the issuance of sexual harassment guidelines, it relied
on provisions in human rights conventions specifically address-
ing women's rights and sexual harassment.272 The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wo-
men ("CEDAW") mandates State action to eliminate gender-
based discrimination in employment and to ensure the rights to
work and to work in safe working conditions. 273 The Court rec-
ognized that sex-based violence, including sexual harassment,
impairs the goal of equality in employment. 274
Finally, the Court relied on international customary law, in
addition to international conventions and domestic sources. 275
International customary law represents one of the main sources
of international law recognizing the right to gender equality. 276
270. Beijing Statement, supra note 269, art. 10. Article 10 provides:
The objectives and functions of the Judiciary include the following:
(a) to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the Rule of Law;
(b) to promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the obser-
vance and the attainment of human rights; and
(c) to administer the law impartially among persons and between persons and
the State.
Id.
271. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (relying on Beijing Statement).
272. See id. (relying on international documents, such as CEDAW, that address wo-
men's issues).
273. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 11, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/
46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/. Article 11 provides that:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimina-
tion against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
a. The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
f. The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions,
including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction
Id.
274. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (citing CEDAW provisions that declare sexual harass-
ment gender specific violence, and therefore hindrance to workplace equality).
275. See id. (relying on international custom).
276. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) (stating that customary law is rule of international law when it has
been accepted by international community of States); see also LILLICH & HANNUM, supra
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To qualify as international customary law, laws proscribing sex-
ual harassment must enjoy general application and States must
enact these laws out of a sense of legal obligation. 277 States'
practice of condemning workplace sexual harassment as anti-
thetical to gender equality is general and consistent, and there-
fore qualifies as customary.278 Further, countries prohibit sexual
harassment out of a sense of legal obligation, thereby also mak-
ing the practice customary. 279 Thus the Indian Court, recogniz-
ing the significance of international norms, stated that the right
to gender equality, as it is globally accepted, includes sexual har-
assment protections and the opportunity to work with dignity.
280
b. Vishaka Guidelines
The Court concluded its opinion by setting forth mandatory
guidelines designed to prevent the sexual harassment of working
women. 281 First, the Court set forth a broad definition of sexual
harassment at work.28 2 Second, the Court imposed an affirma-
tive duty on the employer to prevent the commission of work-
place sexual harassment and the creation of a hostile work envi-
ronment.
283
i. Defining, and Combating, Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment, as the Vishaka Court defined it, can take
many different forms. 2 4 Specifically, sexual harassment is any
note 31, at 93 (explaining that international custom, which evidences general practices
of accepted law, and general principles of law that civilized nations recognize are two of
three major sources of international law).
277. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 276, § 102 (1)-(2) (describing what constitutes
customary international law).
278. See id. § 102 cmt. b (explaining that generality does not require universal ac-
ceptance among States, but rather only wide acceptance among States is necessary).
279. See id. cmt. c (describing "opinio juris," State's sense of legal obligation).
280. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (acknowledging that global community includes pro-
tections from sexual harassment in basic human right of gender equality).
281. See id. (detailing 12 guidelines against sexual harassment in workplace).
282. See id. (defining workplace sexual harassment).
283. See id. (imposing affirmative duty on employer to prevent workplace sexual
harassment).
284. Id. Guideline 2 provides:
sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behavior
(whether directly or by implication) as: a) physical contact and advances; b) a
demand for sexual favors; c) sexually colored remarks; d) showing pornogra-
phy; e) or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sex-
ual nature.
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unwelcome sexual behavior that a harassment victim reasonably
perceives may negatively impact one's health and safety in the
workplace.28 5 Employees are free to raise complaints of any such
behavior in any appropriate forum.2 86 To combat sexual harass-
ment, workplaces must create a complaint mechanism, complete
with a woman-headed complaints committee, which has NGO
representation, and at least half of which is comprised of wo-
men.287 Although these provisions may be sufficient to combat
sexual harassment of women in the workplace, the Court urged
the government to adopt legislation ensuring the observance of
these guidelines.
288
ii. Employer Liability
The Court also imposed an affirmative duty on the em-
ployer to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.28 9 An em-
ployer, in both the public and private sectors, must provide pro-
cedures for deterring workplace sexual harassment and the crea-
tion of a hostile work environment, resolving sexual harassment
claims, and prosecuting acts of sexual harassment.290 Upon the
Id.
285. Id. Guideline 2(e) states that sexual harassment occurs when any of the
above-defined conduct is:
committed in circumstances whereunder the victim of conduct has a reasona-
ble apprehension that in relation to the victim's employment or work[,]
whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or voluntary, whether in Govern-
ment, public or private enterprise[,] such conduct can be humiliating and
may constitute a health and safety problem.
Id.
286. Id. Guideline 8 provides that "[e] mployees should be allowed to raise issues
of sexual harassment at workers' meeting[s] and in other appropriate forum[s], and it
should be affirmatively discussed in Employer-Employee Meetings." Id.
287. See id. Guideline 7 establishes a complaint committee to help administer the
complaint mechanism established in Guideline 6. Id. This guideline is essentialist, be-
cause it assumes that women will all react the same way to sexual harassment com-
plaints. See, e.g., Abrams, Complex Female Subject, supra note 94 (critiquing judicial treat-
ment of female subject as singular entity, rather than as complex subject with many
factors influencing identity). Further, it does not take into account the biases of NGOs.
See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 31, at 452-64 (highlighting methodological and cred-
ibility problems of NGOs).
288. See Vishaka, supra note 4 (explaining that vacuum is present in existing legisla-
tion, and deeming sexual harassment protections "urgent social need").
289. See id. Guideline 1 imposes a duty on the employer and/or any other person
responsible in the workplace and other institutions. Id.
290. See id. Guideline 1 includes an express prohibition against sexual harass-
ment. Id. Guideline 9 contains the duty to notify workers of that express prohibition in
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creation of such workplace rules, the employer must notify all
workers of the anti-sexual harassment policy. 291 The employer
also has a duty to initiate appropriate criminal and/or discipli-
nary action when necessary.29 2 This employer-provided protec-
tion extends to shield workers from third-party harassment.293
C. Post-Vishaka Developments
Even though the Indian Supreme Court in the Vishaka deci-
sion strongly urged governmental action banning sexual harass-
ment, Indian lawmakers have yet to take action. 2 4 Responding
to this lack of legislation, the Indian Supreme Court continues
to decide sexual harassment cases in accordance with the
Vishaka guidelines. 295 In a 1999 case, Apparel Export Promotion
Council v. Chopra,29 6 the Indian Supreme Court reiterated its
guidelines and definition of workplace sexual harassment, dem-
onstrating its sensitivity to workplace gender issues.
2 9 7
The differences between the facts of the Chopra case and
those leading to the Vishaka decision are critical to the Court's
further explanation of, sexual harassment law in Chopra.29 8
Chopra, Chairman of the Apparel Export Promotion Council,
Guideline 1. Id. Guideline 3(d) imposes the duty to provide appropriate work condi-
tions to ensure that a hostile work environment does not exist at work. Id.
291. See id. Guideline 9 states that employers must create awareness regarding sex-
ual harassment protections among all workers, notifying them of the guidelines, as well
as any anti-sexual harassment legislation that may be enacted. Id.
292. See id. Guidelines 4 and 5 provide employers with remedial power. Id.
293. Id. Additionally, and similar to Title VII's retaliation provision, the Indian
employer must ensure that the complainant is not victimized or harassed when initiat-
ing and participating in disciplinary and legal proceedings against her harasser. Id.
294. See Nussbaum, Implementing Sex Equality, supra note 58, at 57 (acknowledging
lack of sexual harassment legislation binding on non-governmental actors and finding
current political climate unfavorable for such legislation to pass); Singh, supra note 195
(explaining that despite Vishaka decision, little has changed for Indian working women,
especially because Indian government has not enacted any legislation on sexual harass-
ment issue, and few sexual harassment cases have been filed); Supreme Court Quasi-Law,
supra note 230 (stating that lack of sexual harassment legislation represents legal void).
295. Chopra, supra note 195.
296. Id.
297. See id.; Singh, supra note 195 (stressing that Chopra decision demonstrates
Court's increasing sympathy toward sexual harassment, and interpreting Chapra deci-
sion as sending message to lower courts that they are obliged to protect women's funda-
mental rights).
298. See Vishaka, supra note 4; cf Chopra, supra note 195.
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sexually harassed his private secretary.299 Disregarding her ob-
jections, Chopra tried to sit too close to her, and to touch her on
several occasions.3 0  Despite his repeated efforts, however,
Chopra never actually succeeded in his attempts to molest his
secretary.3 ° 1  After the secretary complained, Chopra was
fired.302
The Indian Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High
Court's decision that Chopra's dismissal was unwarranted. 30 3
The Delhi High Court had based its decision on the fact that
Chopra never made physical contact with his secretary, and
therefore never actually molested her.30 4 Conversely, the Indian
Supreme Court held that sexual harassment can occur even
when physical contact does not.30 5 Employing a strict interpreta-
tion of the Vishaka guidelines, the Court found Chopra's acts to
constitute sexual harassment, even though they did not fit the
exact dictionary meaning of "molestation" or "physical as-
sault.13 0 6
In deciding the Chopra case, the Court relied on the Vishaka
guidelines, and the legal documents cited therein.31'- Addition-
ally, the Chopra Court cited the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") 30 8 as another
source of relevant law.30 9 Article 7 of the ICESCR recognizes a
299. Chopra, supra note 195 (describing attempts at physical contact and state-
ments Mr. Chopra made to his secretary).. '
300. See id. (listing incidents when Mr. Chopra invaded plaintiff's personal space,
attempting to sit too close to plaintiff, even after she objected).
301. See id. (describing lengths to which plaintiff had to go in order to avoid
Chopra's advances, including pressing elevator emergency button).
302. See id. (detailing complaint mechanism plaintiff used, and subsequent investi-
gation findings, that resulted in Chopra's dismissal).
303. Id.
304. See id. (quoting Division Bench of High Court, which found it completely
impossible to conclude that Chopra attempted to molest plaintiff because there was no
physical contact between Chopra and plaintiff).
305. See id. (explaining that harasser's failure to establish any physical contact with
woman he harassed does not mean that he had not made any objectionable overtures
containing sexual overtones).
306. See id. (criticizing Delhi High Court for being persuaded by narrow technicali-
ties and insignificant discrepancies).
307. See id. (relying on Vishaka guidelines, Indian Constitution, Beijing Declara-
tion, and CEDAW).
308. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "ICESCR"].
309. See Chopra, supra note 195 (stating that ICESCR contains provisions particu-
larly important for women's rights).
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woman's right to fair work conditions and freedom from sexual
harassment, which can impair the working environment. 310 Fur-
thermore, the Chopra Court held that Chopra violated Indian
Code, Section 354, which prohibits outraging the modesty of a
woman.
3 11
The Court's unprecedented decisions in the Vishaka and
Chopra cases surprised Indian feminists, who praised these re-
cent developments." 2 Urvashi Butalia, a leader of the Indian
women's group, Kali, stated that Indian women should enjoy
these progressive and useful decisions, especially considering the
usually anti-woman decisions of the Supreme Court.31 3 Report-
ers covering the decision noted the Court's growing sensitivity
towards the issue of sexual harassment, as well as the extremely
important power given to women in the workplace to remedy
difficult situations of gender-based discrimination.314 Finally,
some Indians expressed the view that pro-woman sexual harass-
ment decisions were positive steps, because it was simply time for
the matter to be addressed.315
310. ICESCR, supra note 308, art. 7. Article 7 states:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in par-
ticular:
(b) ... safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of se-
niority and competence.
Id.
311. See Chopra, supra note 195 (emphasizing that Chopra's behavior offended
plaintiffs modesty and stood in opposition to morality and decency); see also Rupan
Deol Bajaj and Another v. Kanwar Pal Sign Gill and Another, available at http://
www.lawinc.com (using English dictionaries to determine meaning of "modest," and
then analyzing definition in relation to women).
312. See Murthy, supra note 195 (describing positive reaction to decisions from
women's groups).
313. See id. (quoting Urvashi Butalia, Indian women's rights activist, about overall
anti-woman character of Indian Supreme Court).
314. See Bhandare, supra note 5 (quoting statements of Delhi bureaucrat who suf-
fered sexual harassment, concerning great power for redress that guidelines provide);
Singh, supra note 195.
315. See Bhagat, supra note 201 (stating that Vishaka guidelines represent measure
long overdue, as is open discussion of prevalent sexual harassment problem). For a
discussion of why this problem was often hushed, see Sunder, supra note 195 (explain-
ing that sexual harassment was viewed as Western problem, not Indian issue).
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III. A VIBRANT CONTRAST: AN ANALYSIS
While the Indian Supreme Court's pro-woman measures re-
present progress, one must not be too quick to claim absolute
success for the Indian women's movement. After all, as dis-
cussed throughout this Part, U.S. sexual harassment cases, which
also appear incredibly progressive, are replete with sexist as-
sumptions and paternalistic attitudes. Instead, one must criti-
cally examine both Indian and U.S. legal decisions, both by
themselves and in relation to the advances and flaws of other
systems. This Part of the Comment compares and evaluates the
sexual harassment laws in India and the United States. Particu-
larly examined are the flaws in the earlier-established system in
the United States, and whether the Indian Court adopted or
ameliorated those flaws in its guidelines.
A comparison of the U.S. and Indian Supreme Courts' ap-
proaches to deciding sexual harassment cases permits examina-
tion of the respective judicial doctrines, as well as the sex-based
social roles and norms upon which both Courts rely. A doctrinal
comparison reveals the different sources the Courts cite in de-
ciding sexual harassment cases, the Courts' similar definitions of
workplace sexual harassment, and the Courts' views and applica-
tions of employer liability. Analysis of the Courts' sexual harass-
ment cases also exposes the gender roles and societal percep-
tions concerning "appropriate" women's behavior that informed
the Courts' decisions.
A. Doctrinal Comparison
A doctrinal comparison of the U.S. and Indian Supreme
Court sexual harassment decisions demonstrates important dif-
ferences and similarities in each Court's approach to defining
sexual harassment and deciding sexual harassment cases. First,
the two Courts look to different sources of law to decide sexual
harassment cases. 16 Second, both Courts set forth a broad defi-
nition of sexual harassment.317 Finally, both Courts impose em-
316. See supra notes 157, 159, 163 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Su-
preme Court cases in which courts relied on Title VII); cf supra 253-75, 309-11 and
accompanying text (discussing sources on which Indian Supreme Court relied in
Vishaka).
317. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (stating U.S. Supreme Court's
definition of sexual harassment); cf supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (stating
Indian Supreme Court's definition of sexual harassment).
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ployer liability for workplace sexual harassment, but the level of
employer responsibility entailed varies. 18
1. Sources of Law and Their Effect
In defining sexual harassment, and determining what be-
havior meets that definition, the U.S. and Indian Supreme
Courts look to different legal sources. The U.S Supreme Court
relies on only one source, Title VII, to prohibit sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.319 As evidenced in the Meritor decision
recognizing the hostile work environment conception of sexual
harassment,12° and with the quid pro quo opinions, 2 1 the Court
reads Title VII's language to include sexual harassment as a form
of sex discrimination because the statute explicitly forbids any
form of discrimination based on sex. 2 2
The Court's expansive reading of Title VII provides women
suffering from workplace harassment with recourse. The
Court's complete reliance on a singular statutory source, how-
ever, implies that that source of law alone is sufficient to combat
sexual harassment, even though other sexual harassment
prohibitions, such as international conventions, may exist. This
implication departs from Professor MacKinnon's ideals regard-
ing legislators' potentially ongoing role in creating anti-discrimi-
nation laws that address the power disparity between men and
women.
323
Unlike the U.S. Court's sexual harassment decisions, which
rely on a single statutory tool, the Indian Supreme Court bases
its sexual harassment decisions on several documents, both do-
mestic and international.3 24 The Indian Court may need to cite
a greater variety of legal sources because no country-wide legisla-
318. See supra notes 179-80, 183-85, 289-92 and accompanying text (describing im-
position of employer liability).
319. See supra notes 157, 159, 163 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which courts relied solely on Title VII).
320. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text (describing "hostile work envi-
ronment" concept and Meritor decision).
321. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (explaining "quid pro quo"
concept and relevant decision).
322. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (explaining holding in Saxbe).
323. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing Professor MacKinnon's
ideal legislative approach to sexual harassment law).
324. See supra notes 253-74, 308-10 and accompanying text (discussing domestic
and international documents that Indian Supreme Court cited in sexual harassment
cases).
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tion exists in India specifically addressing the issue of sexual har-
assment.325 However, the Indian Court bases its sexual harass-
ment decisions not only on other sources of national law, but
also on international conventions and international customary
law. 26
First, the Indian Court grounds its analysis in the Indian
Constitution,3 2 7 thus recognizing the need for an Indian solu-
tion to a problem that is, in part, specific to Indian women as
Indians. 28 Women in India inhabit a complex space because of
their many intersecting identities3 29 and identifications, 330 cul-
tural uniqueness, and national pride, and therefore experience
a reality distinct from their Western counterparts.33 1 This dis-
tinct and complex identity may conflict with Western ideas of
feminism and policies designed to help women. 2 For example,
Indian feminists' experience includes the impact of Western
colonialism and imperialism, and is thus different from that of
white feminists in the United States.333 Therefore, the Court's
reliance on sources that reflect the importance of Indian wo-
men's cultural and national identifications both demonstrates
respect for those identifications and increases the relevance and
acceptability of the Court's initial solutions to the problem of
sexual harassment in the Indian workplace.
Professor Sunder explains that Indian women, when re-
325. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (recognizing that Vishaka guide-
lines function to fill legal void that lack of sexual harassment protection creates).
326. See supra notes 253-80, 309-11 and accompanying text (discussing all' sources
that Indian Supreme Court cited in sexual harassment cases).
327. See supra notes 254-61, 263-67 and accompanying text (noting relevant provi-
sions in Indian Constitution).
328. See supra notes 229, 231-37 and accompanying text (presenting concern that
many Indian feminists face as to appropriate response to issue of sexual harassment).
329. See supra notes 206, 229, 244 and accompanying text (explaining how multi-
tude of factors combine to form complex Indian female subject, which Tide VII does
not adequately address).
330. See supra notes 205, 223 and accompanying text (addressing different forces
influencing Indian woman's life and identity-formation).
331. See supra notes 205-26 and accompanying text (explaining unique aspects of
sexual harassment problem in India, and acknowledging that Indian women have diffi-
culty articulating problem of sexual harassment because they face conflicting alliances
and models).
332. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (comparing views held in India
and United States about women's traditional roles and women's problems).
333. See supra notes 205-27 and accompanying text (mentioning aspects of Indian
history that differentiate experience of Indian women from that of certain Western
women).
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sponding to women's issues like workplace sexual harassment,
struggle with often conflicting ideals concerning loyalty to In-
dian traditions and equality for women.334 To tackle sexual har-
assment, Indians must articulate and address the problem in a
manner specific to their realities. 5 Professor Sunder asserts
that Indian feminists want protections against sexual harassment
that integrate old nationalistic loyalties with new, Western-influ-
enced thought and theory to shape their movement.3 36
The Indian Court's deliberate reliance on Indian sources of
law helps construct a nation-specific solution to problems of sex-
ual harassment, as Professor Sunder advocates.3 3 7 Such an ap-
proach recognizes the identity of women in India as Indians, and
the problems specific to the experience of being a woman in
Indian society. For example, the Court cites Article 15 of the
Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on,
among other categories, religion, caste, and birthplace.338
These particular identities, in addition to gender, influence how
Indian women are treated, or mistreated, in the workplace and
beyond.3 39 Thus, the Court addresses factors that influence In-
dian women's experiences, revealing a sensitivity to the fact that
sexual harassment in the Indian workplace is a problem with dis-
tinctly Indian characteristics.
Second, distinct from the American approach, the Indian
Court also relied on international human rights conventions and
norms.34 ° Initially, critics may disparage the Court for depend-
334. See supra notes 197-98, 216 and accompanying text (recognizing many cul-
tural and political factors influence Indian women's responses to issue of sexual harass-
ment).
335. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (stating need for Indian-specific
response to problem of sexual harassment).
336. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (stating that Indian women create
new identities through combining old loyalties with new ways of life and forms of imag-
ining themselves as women, individuals, and Indians).
337. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting that this looks different
from earlier feminist movements in Third World countries, where feminists often used
international human rights discourse to argue their cause, as opposed to nation-specific
arguments).
338. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (detailing Article 15 of Indian Con-
stitution).
339. See supra note 205 (asserting that problems Indian woman faces are particular
to social situation of that woman because of her caste and region in which she lives).
340. See supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text (describing international docu-
ments and customs that Indian Supreme Court cited).
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ing on non-Indian legal sources in crafting Indian law. 4 1 The
Court, however, used the applicable international human rights
covenants and norms as a-supplement to the Constitution.342
The deference the Court displayed to domestic constitutional
provisions when interpreting and applying international conven-
tions demonstrates that the Court viewed Indian constitutional
guarantees as being of primary importance. 43 This interpreta-
tion of international legal sources in light of Indian law is a na-
tion-specific approach, for which Indian feminists advocated.344
The Indian Court's decision represents a middle ground be-
tween universalism and relativism, emphasizing and relying on
rights found in the Indian Constitution, as well as international
documents.
At the same time, the Indian Court's citation of interna-
tional conventions affords an admirably great amount of defer-
ence to the international community's mandates for gender
equality. The Court cites international human rights documents
and international customs that view gender equality as a funda-
mental human right. The international sources the Indian deci-
sion relies upon include women's rights provisions in interna-
tional conventions, such as CEDAW and the ICCPR, 4 and inter-
national custom.
346
In comparison, the United States Supreme Court disregards
legal sources outside of Title VII, thereby failing to acknowledge
the United States' obligation as a member of the global commu-
nity to strive for equality in the workplace. Such an omission by
341. See supra note 128 (contrasting Indian women's movement with earlier Third
World women's movements that eschewed nationalist approaches for international
human rights discourse, and stating that many Indian feminists disparage feminist con-
cerns about sexual harassment as Western).
342. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text (explaining how international
conventions can be harmonized with Indian Constitution).
343. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text (maintaining that any interna-
tional convention that is consistent with fundamental rights that Indian Constitution
guarantees must be read into Constitution's provisions in order to enlarge their mean-
ing and further promote their objectives).
344. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (explaining unique Indian ex-
perience of sexual harassment, and subsequent need for unique approach to problem
of sexual harassment).
345. See supra notes 269-74, 309-11 and accompanying text (describing relevant
sections of international human rights documents that Indian Supreme Court cited).
346. See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text (explaining role of custom in
international law).
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the U.S. Supreme Court, combined with its failure to explore the
issue of sexual harassment beyond a Title VII perspective, im-
plies that the U.S. legal system does not-value workplace gender
equality as highly as international human rights conventions de-
mand.
2. Definitions of Sexual Harassment
The U.S. and Indian Courts both posit a similar definition
of sexual harassment. U.S. courts define sexual harassment as
the sex-based imposition of an unwanted condition on a per-
son's employment.347 Similarly, the Indian Court defines sexual
harassment as unwelcome sexually-determined behavior, reason-
ably perceived to negatively impact one's workplace environ-
ment.348 Therefore, according to both definitions, unwelcome
behavior inflicted because of the harassed person's sex is sexual
harassment. As such, the U.S. and the Indian Courts define sex-
ual harassment broadly.
Both the U.S. and Indian Courts recognize that sexual har-
assment can occur through physical incidents and threats, but is
not limited to such events. 349 Rather, both entities acknowledge
that an employee may reasonably 50 perceive the creation of a
"hostile work environment. ''351 The Courts demand a compre-
hensive review of the total workplace circumstances to deter-
mine whether the offensive behavior qualifies as sexual harass-
ment.35 2 Further, both Courts realize that sexual harassment
can take several forms. For example, in both countries, sexual
harassment can exist when a supervisor continuously makes off-
347. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (stating U.S. Supreme Court's
definition of sexual harassment).
348. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (stating Indian Supreme
Court's definition of sexual harassment).
349. See supra notes 154, 158, 284 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. and
Indian Supreme Courts' definitions of what conduct constitutes sexual harassment).
350. See supra notes 178, 285 and accompanying text (describing U.S. and Indian
Supreme Courts' reasonable person standard).
351. See supra notes 159-78, 296-306 and accompanying text (describing U.S. and
Indian Supreme Courts' recognition of hostile work environment).
352. See Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (explaining that complainant's
sexually provocative speech or dress relevant in determining whether he or she found
particular sexual advances unwelcome); see supra note 195 and accompanying text (stat-
ing that courts are required to examine everything material to determine genuineness
of complaint, including victim's statement, in relevant context).
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color comments, even if actual physical contact never occurs. 53
The United States Court's sexual harassment definition may
be more limited than the Indian Court's definition given the
U.S. Supreme Court's requirement that sexual harassment be
"severe or pervasive."3"4 The Court requires that unwelcome be-
havior be sufficiently "severe or pervasive" so as to alter the work-
place environment and the conditions of the harassed worker's
employment.3 5 5 According to U.S. courts, isolated instances of
"non-severe misconduct" and merely offensive comments do not
create an abusive environment.3 56 Therefore, a harassed worker
may not have a claim against her harasser if he engaged in the
offensive behavior only once.
In comparison, the Indian Court's definition of sexual har-
assment does not explicitly require that harassing behavior per-
sist over time. Instead, the guideline language implies that an
incident, or only a few incidents, can constitute harassment. For
example, the Indian Court asserts that a "request" for sexual fa-
vors or the "showing of pornography" constitutes sexual harass-
ment.3 57 The Court does not refer to these instances in the plu-
ral, thereby indicating that harassing incidents do not have to be
persistent to constitute a valid sexual harassment claim. Moreo-
ver, the Court declares that sexual harassment includes any sin-
gle act that outrages the modesty of a woman. 58 Again, one of-
fensive act is sufficient to meet the definition.
3. Employer Liability
Employers in both the United States and India are held lia-
353. See supra notes 163-65, 284 and accompanying text (defining sexual harass-
ment to include hostile work environment). For example, the Indian guidelines in-
clude showing pornography or making any sexually colored remarks. See Vishaka, supra
note 4.
354. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (citing U.S. Supreme Court's
severe or pervasive requirement).
355. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme
Court's decision of what constitutes hostile work environment).
356. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing severe and perva-
sive requirement).
357. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (noting Indian Supreme
Court's definition of sexual harassment set out in Vishaka guidelines).
358. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (describing Indian Code Section
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ble for their employees' harassing behavior.359 More impor-
tantly, both the Indian and U.S. Courts recognize that the em-
ployer occupies a powerful position from which to prevent sex-
ual harassment.360 Theorists, policymakers, and judges share
this opinion.361' For example, Professor MacKinnon urged legis-
lative action that would force employers to work towards work-
place equality, emphasizing the promise for change that the em-
ployer's role holds. 62 Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court in Faragher noted that Tide VII's authors and enforcers
clearly intended that the statute encourage employer prevention
of sexual harassment.3 63 Besides providing redress for or elimi-
nation of sexual harassment, employers have the ability to en-
force reasonable rules for workplace behavior.3 64 Employers can
therefore take positive action, prescribing workplace standards
that challenge excuses given to support practices that hurt wo-
men.
3 6 5
Although U.S. and Indian judicial reasoning for employer
involvement in sexual harassment complaints is similar, the em-
ployer's role differs in the two countries. While both countries'
approaches present employers as active participants in the fight
against sexual harassment, the U.S. Supreme Court employer lia-
bility decisions imply that the employer's role in the United
States is reactionary, as opposed to proactive. 66 First, although
the threat of liability may convince employers to take prevent-
ative action against sexual harassment, this important suggestion
359. See supra notes 179-80, 183-85, 289-92 and accompanying text (explaining de-
cisions concerning employer liability).
360. See supra notes 183, 289 and accompanying text (imposing employer liability
because of employer ability to prevent workplace sexual harassment).
361. See supra notes 183-85, 289-92 and accompanying text (asserting employer's
affirmative role and ability to prevent workplace sexual harassment).
362. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (explaining Professor MacKinnon's
ideal employer role in comparison with Court's assignation of employer liability). Note,
however, that the Court did not take any action in accordance with Professor MacKin-
non's suggestion until it decided Faragher and Burlington in 1998.
363. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (recognizing that
finding employer liability for supervisor action helps implement Congress's Tide VII
statutory policy and complements Government's Title VII enforcement efforts).
364. See supra note, 184 and accompanying text (recognizing employer ability to
prevent and/or punish sexual harassment in workplace).
365. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (explaining Professor MacKinnon's
ideal for employer roles regarding workplace sexual harassment).
366. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (describing employer role in
preventing sexual harassment at work).
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is only explicitly evident in the Faragher and Ellerth requirements
that employers establish a complaint mechanism. 67 Second, ex-
cepting liability for an employer's failure to create a complaint
mechanism, the Court imposes liability on an employer only af-
ter its employee creates a hostile work environment and the
harassed employee complains.168 Thus, a court cannot hold the
employer liable for the harassment that occurred if the em-
ployee never complained.369
Finally, an employer in the United States can establish an
affirmative defense against the imposition of liability.3 7° There-
fore, while the Court advocates employer responsibility for main-
taining a discrimination-free work environment, the Court did
not carry this position as far as those scholars who promote em-
ployer accountability would prefer 1.3 7  For example, Professor
MacKinnon suggests that there should be some degree of em-
ployer accountability in every sexual harassment case regardless
of the employer's knowledge of, or acquiescence to, the sexually
harassing conduct. 372 Instead, the affirmative defense to liability
limits employer responsibility, permitting a discrimination-in-
fused environment to persist without employer intervention sim-
ply because an employee failed to complain.
Instead of providing an affirmative defense, the Indian ap-
proach mandates affirmative employer action. Like employers
in the United States, Indian employers in both the public and
private sectors must create measures for resolving sexual harass-
ment claims. According to the Indian Court, Indian employ-
ers have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace.374 Unlike the United States Court's interpretation of
367. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that employee can
avail herself of complaint mechanism).
368. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (explaining that employer is
vicariously liable for supervisor's harassing of subordinate).
369. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (explaining that employee who
fails to use employer's complaint mechanism cannot seek redress).
370. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (describing employer's affirma-
tive defense).
371. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (explaining rule regarding em-
ployer liability and noting Professor MacKinnon's criticism).
372. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (explaining Professor MacKinnon's
ideal for employer liability).
373. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text (describing employer responsi-
bility and liability under Vishaka guidelines).
374. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (stating employer's duty).
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Title VII's employer responsibility provision, this duty extends
beyond the creation of an express prohibition against sexual har-
assment, and subsequent worker notification of that prohibi-
tion. v5 Instead, an Indian employer must provide a procedure
for resolution of the problem, not just a mechanism through
which to register a complaint.3 76 Also, an Indian employer is ex-
pected to provide appropriate work conditions to ensure that a
hostile work environment does not exist at the workplace.377
Even though it is unclear what exactly constitutes non-hostile
conditions, this mandate is important because it forces employ-
ers to take preventative action beyond mere censure of such acts.
Compared with the United States Court's implication that em-
ployers must react only to sexual harassment complaints, the In-
dian Court's decisions describe the employer's role as explicitly
preventative, and therefore proactive.
Similarly, the Vishaka guidelines providing for employer le-
gal action stress the importance of a proactive employer. An em-
ployer's duty includes her initiation of appropriate criminal ac-
tion, under the Indian Penal Code, and/or disciplinary action,
under any other appropriate law.37  Thus, the Indian employer
must aid in the punishment of employees who commit sex-based
harassment, outside the narrow confines of workplace complaint
mechanisms. Mandating the launch of such action external to
the workplace demonstrates a view that sex-based harassment is
inappropriate and intolerable.379
375. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (describing Vishaka requirement
that employer notify workers of complaint procedure). Professor MacKinnon, however,
may agree with the extent to which the Indian Court enforces employer responsibility.
See supra notes 362, 365, and 372 (describing Professor MacKinnon's ideal concerning
employer's role in preventing sexual harassment).
376. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (describing Vishaka Guidelines that
requires employer provide procedure to resolve sexual harassment problem, not just
complaint procedure).
377. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (explaining that harassment can
occur in workplace, even without physical contact).
378. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (explaining employer's duty to ini-
tiate appropriate action, and that Vishaka Guidelines grant employers remedial pow-
ers).
379. See, e.g., supra 293 and accompanying text (explaining further that employers
must ensure that complaining female employee is not harassed in complaint process).
Not only does this encourage employees to report harassment, but it also protects the
complainant against the creation of a hostile environment throughout the disciplinary
process.
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B. Power and Gender Roles, Compared
Unfortunately, the U.S. and Indian Courts' sexual harass-
ment decisions fail to address power disparities and gender roles
that serve to oppress women in both the United States and India.
Both Courts disregard the role male economic and societal
power plays in sexual harassment cases, focusing instead on the
sexual aspect of sexual harassment.38 0 Moreover, the Indian and
U.S. Courts' approaches to the problem of sexual harassment at
work reflect ideas in each country about women's proper roles
in their respective societies, especially in relation to men and
male sexuality.3 81
1. Power
Both the U.S. and Indian Supreme Courts analyze sexual
harassment cases through the lens of heterosexual male desire,
with the sexual advance or act as the focal point of the analysis.
The U.S. Supreme Court's application of Title VII disregards wo-
men's non-sexual workplace experiences because courts do not
center hostile work environment analyses around the male-fe-
male power disparity, and the conduct resulting from that dis-
parity, in which the harasser would not engage if not for the fe-
male sex of the harassed.382 Instead, U.S. courts focus on men's
reaction to, and desire for, women. 38 ' These courts ignore both
the male position of power that enables men to harass women, at
work and in general, and the sexualized view of women that such
application of the law presents.3 84 Thus, the prevailing model
found in U.S. sexual harassment case law does not address sex-
ual harassment as a male's imposition and exploitation of his
economic clout, but rather considers sexual harassment as an
380. See supra notes 140-50, 248, 300 and accompanying text (recognizing sexual
focus of sexual harassment decisions).
381. See supra notes 121-26, 199-204, 217-21 and accompanying text (describing
gender roles manifest in sexual harassment case decisions).
382. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text (explaining and critiquing
dominant paradigm for examining sexual harassment cases in United States).
383. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining male, heterosexual-
centered view of sexual harassment cases); see also CAmuALtAs, supra note 78, at 13 (ar-
guing against male-centered view and objective standards, because listening to women's
subjective experience is important for identifying exclusions in law, as well as remedies
either not recognized or minimized).
384. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text (discussing sexual harassment
as imposition of male power and authority).
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expression of male sexuality. Because the Court's analyses em-
phasize sexual desire instead of the underlying gender roles that
enable sexual harassment, the Court does not fully take into ac-
count the power differentials between men and women that
MacKinnon claims motivate sexual harassment.38 5
The Indian Court's examination of workplace sexual harass-
ment also demonstrates a sexual harassment model that revolves
around male sexual desire. The few reported Indian workplace
sexual harassment cases involve sex-based discrimination that is
sexual in nature.3 6 The fact patterns of these cases, which in-
volve inappropriate sexual contact, or attempts at such contact,
present male heterosexual desire as the force compelling the
workplace harassment of women.
The Indian Court's guidelines for the resolution of sexual
harassment claims, however, acknowledge the power differential
between men and women. One can interpret the Court's re-
quirement that employers establish a woman-headed complaints
committee, at least half of which is comprised of women, 37 as
considering both the power dynamics between men and women,
at work and otherwise, and the value of women's subjective
experiences.38 9 Instead of permitting men to control and judge
women's sexual harassment complaints, this committee make-up
requirement places Indian women, who may share common ex-
periences of sex-based oppression, in a position to help other
385. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text (reflecting this observation by
noting that women who are perceived as sexually bold are less likely to receive legal
remedy).
386. See supra notes 248, 300 and accompanying text (explaining that Vishaka case
involved brutal rape and Chopra case involved attempts at physical contact). But see
Vishaka, supra note 4 (providing protection against sexual behavior that is both direct
or implied).
This may not be directly attributable to any action of the Indian Court because the
Court cannot influence who decides to bring a complaint. However, the facts found in
the existing cases reveal the same patterns as those found in cases in the United States,
and thus raise a point for comparison.
387. See supra notes 113, 244 and accompanying text (discussing essentialism in
women's issues). This guideline raises several concerns. First, it is essentialist, assuming
that women will all react the same way to sexual harassment complaints. Second, it
does not take into account the biases NGOs hold. See also supra note 287 and accompa-
nying text (highlighting methodological and credibility problems of NGOs).
388. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (discussing power dynamics
between men and women).
389. See supra note 383 and accompanying text (stressing value of women's subjec-
tive experience).
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Indian women."' 0 Further, the Court respects Indian feminists'
wish for a shift in the focus of sexual harassment law.391 Rather
than viewing sexual harassment solely in terms of sex-based acts,
the Court's complaint mechanism remedy acknowledges the in-
fluence that gender-related cultural norms have on sexual har-
assment.
2. Gender Roles
Both the U.S. and Indian Court decisions reveal implicit
opinions about what constitutes appropriate behavior for wo-
men. 39 2 Subsequently, this "proper" behavior helps the courts
determine who deserves protection from sexual harassment. As
such, sexual harassment decisions in both the United States and
India reflect a judicial paternalism, which is itself a product of
the male-female power disparities that exist in U.S. and Indian
society.
3 9 3
The sexual paternalism of the U.S. judiciary is obvious in
the application of certain statutory language concerning sexual
harassment and court-determined conditions for redress. First,
U.S. case law is designed to protect women from sex-related inju-
ries, and therefore associates sexual harassment with sexual ad-
vances. 394 This association rests upon the stereotypical view of
females as sexual objects. 395 Sexual harassment rules grant or
deny protection based on a woman's perceived sexuality and sex-
ual promiscuity. 396 For example, the "unwelcomeness" require-
ment forces women to act wholesome and chaste, in accordance
with socially-prescribed gender roles, in order to have a valid sex-
390. See supra notes 206, 223 and accompanying text (noting many intersecting
identities that influence Indian women).
391. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (tracing evolution of Indian
feminists' approach to problem of sexual harassment).
392. See supra notes 121-26, 199-204, 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing
stifling behavior that women in both United States and India are expected to meet).
393. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (noting traditional women's
roles).
394. See supra note 199 (describing Frug's theory on relationship between legal
discourse and women's bodies).
395. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (recognizing that women's tradi-
tional roles include that of male sexual object).
396. See supra notes 122-24, 200 and accompanying text (explaining that women
are expected to act within traditional female gender role in order to receive adequate
legal protection).
1278 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1205
ual harassment claim. 97 The courts protect the "proper" victim,
who appears to be a sexually pure and passive victim of a sexual
predator. 98
Second, employers can escape liability if an employee who
suffered harassment failed to- use complaint mechanisms.399
This requirement implies a false comparison, because a woman's
failure to complain does not amount to her welcoming sexually
abusive behavior. Thus, a hostile work environment may persist,
but a woman who worked in such an environment is denied rem-
edy once she fails to complain. 40 0 The irony of this situation is
frustrating: because raising a sexual harassment complaint re-
quires a great deal of strength, a woman who complains may ap-
pear too strong to be perceived as a "proper" victim. 40 1
The courts' focus on the sexual advance as the quintessen-
tial act of sexual harassment, promotes improper paternalistic
motivations for bestowing anti-harassment protections to wo-
men.40 2 Instead of promoting empowerment, the courts' deci-
sions can be read as using sexual harassment law to ensure the
historical ideal of women's sexual purity, virtue, and sensibil-
ity.4° 3 Furthermore, protecting women through the emphasis on
sexual acts in sexual harassment cases permits judges to evade
their responsibility to address broader gender-based forms of
work disadvantage. 40 4 Thus, the present legal regime and its en-
forcers serve to reinforce society's views regarding sexual con-
duct and supposedly proper female deportment because they
deny remedy to those women who step outside societal conven-
397. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining that women who do
not act within prescribed gender roles do not always receive adequate legal protection).
398. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing instances where courts did
not protect woman who did not meet standards of propriety).
399. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (explaining affirmative de-
fense).
400. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (explaining how affirmative
defense works against employee).
401. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (explaining traditional wo-
men's role and difficulties that women who defy that role face).
402. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (demonstrating that U.S. courts are
more likely to assist women who fit ideal of "proper" victim).
403. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (describing traditional wo-
men's roles and asserting that not all women meet those ideals, especially women who
are not white and upper-middle class).
404. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (recognizing judicial promise for
social change).
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405tions.
Whereas the United States courts' decisions imply that wo-
men need protection, the Indian Court's words and actions are
much more explicit on this point. Initially, it seems that pater-
nalism motivated the Indian Court's ,Vishaka decision. The
Court's ratification of the anti-harassment guidelines suggests a
motive beyond preventing sexual harassment. The rare proac-
tive nature of the Court's action suggests that the Court thought
it had to protect women at work in the absence of appropriate
legislation.4 °6
More explicitly, the language the Indian Court employed in
both setting forth the anti-sexual harassment guidelines and
writing its decision is rife with paternalistic suggestions. The
guidelines refer to the harassed woman as a "victim," implying
her subordinated position.4 °7 The Indian Court finds unwel-
come behavior in any attempt to "outrage the modesty of a wo-
man," an offense under the Indian Penal Code.40 8 This Indian
legal concept resembles U.S. courts' decisions that determine
unwelcomeness in relation to female demeanor, yet the Indian
law is obviously more explicit. Instead of focusing on the men
who do not control their sexual desire, the Court's interpreta-
tion of this provision centers on the behavior of the women
whose modesty has been "outraged."4 9 The Court's definition
of sexual harassment in a criminal context, which specifically re-
lates modesty to womanhood, 41 0 places a burden on women,
who are expected to behave in accordance with socially accept-
405. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text; see also Frug, supra note 199, at
1063 (claiming that changing current legal regime would weaken current societal mod-
els of female sexual behavior).
406. See supra notes 250, 313-15 and accompanying text (stating that Court's deci-
sion was "rare affirmative action").
407. See supra notes 281-92 and accompanying text (summarizing Vishaka guide-
lines). For example, Guideline 4, on criminal proceedings, states that, "[the employer]
should ensure that victims, or witnesses, are not victimized or discriminated against while
dealing with complaints of sexual harassment." (emphasis added). See generally Vishaka,
supra note 4. Guideline 6, on complaint mechanisms, states that, "an appropriate com-
plaints mechanism should be created in the employer's organization for redress of the
complaint made by the victim." (emphasis added). Id.
408. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (explaining Chopra's Indian Penal
Code violation).
409. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (explaining penal code violation
concerning woman's modesty).
410. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing Court's determination
of definition of "modest," and implications of such meaning).
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able gender standards and roles. The Court's definition in-
cludes chastity of thought and conduct, decency, delicacy, pro-
priety of dress, and an aversion to lewdness.411 If a woman does
not act appropriately, protections against harassment may not
apply to her.
The paternalistic approaches of both the U.S. Court and the
Indian Court fail to recognize the complex nature of the female
subject that anti-sexual harassment measures supposedly protect.
Tangible factors, such as race and social class, and intangible fac-
tors, such as the distribution of power between the sexes, inter-
sect with gender, and each other, to construct the identity of the
subject of the harassment.4 12 Both Courts' paternalistic ap-
proaches are one-dimensional.
The United States Supreme Court focuses on biology, in the
form of male sexual desire for women, as the reason for sexual
harassment. 413 This focus demonstrates an approach to sexual
harassment that does not acknowledge the myriad of other
forces that shape harassment. The Indian Court's response to
Indian women's sexual harassment complaints also evidences a
one-dimensional attitude. Indian Court guidelines fail to recog-
nize the differing regional, religious, and class identities of In-
dian women.41 4 While the Indian Court, as discussed above, ac-
knowledges that gender power disparities exist and that gender
equality is a fundamental human right, that Court relies on a
stereotypical view of women to reach those seemingly progres-
sive conclusions. For example, the complaint review board for-
mation provision requiring that a certain number of women sit
on the board relies on stereotypes;41 5 women must act as judges
for other women's complaints because Indian women will under-
stand each other's situations, and will be more sympathetic to
each other's needs. Similarly, the stereotypical idea that modest
women need protection from male sexual advances motivates
411. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (citing English dictionaries).
412. See supra notes 113, 223, 244 and accompanying text (criticizing essentialist
approaches to examining women's situations, and emphasizing many different influ-
ences that contribute to women's identities).
413. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text (explaining view that sexual
harassment analysis is linked to male biological desire).
414. See supra notes 281-92 and accompanying text (summarizing Vishaka guide-
lines).
415. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (describing complaint review
board).
2002] THE SPECTRUM OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ADVOCACY 1281
the Indian Court's treatment of sexual harassment claims. Thus,
the Court's impetus for establishing the preventative guidelines
rests upon a singular conception of the Indian woman, rather
than a recognition of her complexity.
CONCLUSION
The fight against sexual harassment in the workplace, both
in the United States and India, represents an opportunity for
feminists to work together in order to confront a pressing prob-
lem. Valuable comparisons educate feminists in both India and
the United States about their respective sexual harassment pro-
tections and how those protections function simultaneously to
help and hurt women in the workplace. Moreover, self-reflec-
tion in this combined effort at advocacy facilitates non-imperial-
ist, non-hierarchical cross-cultural comparisons. Feminists in the
United States and India with presuppositions about other cul-
tures are forced to examine the culture in which they live, and
the gender roles encoded within the laws that govern their daily
lives. U.S. and Indian feminists can consider the forces shaping
their experiences, and how they differ from and resemble those
of women elsewhere. This self-reflective approach to cross-cul-
tural comparison provides feminists and advocates in both cul-
tures with insight into successful and unsuccessful tactics and ap-
proaches to problems that women face everywhere.
